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ARTICLES
The Arithmetic of Arsenic
CASS R. SUNSTEIN*
ABSTRACT
What does cost-benefit analysis mean, or do, in actual practice? When agencies
engage in cost-benefit balancing, what are the interactions among law, science, and
economics? This Article attempts to answer that question by exploring, in some
detail, the controversy over the EPA's proposed regulation of arsenic in drinking
water The largest finding is that often science can produce only "benefit ranges, "
and wide ones at that. With reasonable assumptions based on the scientific data
before the EPA at the time it made its initial decision, the proposed arsenic
regulation can be projected to save as few as 0 lives and as many as 112. With
reasonable assumptions, the monetized benefits of the regulation can range from $0
to $560 million. In these circumstances, there is no obviously right decision for
government agencies to make. These points have numerous implications for lawyers
and courts, suggesting both the ease of bringing legal challenges on grounds
specified here and the importance of judicial deference in the face of scientific
uncertainty. There are also policy implications. Agencies should be given the
authority to issue more targeted, cost-effective regulations. They should also be
required to accompany the cost-benefit analysis with an effort to identify the winners
and losers, to see if poor people are mostly hurt or mostly helped.
Americans may disagree on a lot of things, but drinking arsenic isn't one of
them .... When you turn on the kitchen sink, you ought to be able to drink
what comes out, without worrying about being poisoned.'
"What we know is a drop, what we do not know-an ocean." In spite of
significant gains in knowledge, we are still moving mainly in the dark when
dealing with the quantitative importance of risk factors in chemical carcinogen-
esis, the mechanisms of action of chemical carcinogens, and hence, their
detection and the assessment of their risks to human health. The basic
understanding... is still missing.2
* Karl N. Llewellyn Distinguished Service Professor of Jurisprudence, Law School and Department
of Political Science, University of Chicago. A revised and abridged version of this Article will appear in
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON (forthcoming 2002). 1 am grateful to Laura Warren for outstanding
research assistance and to Jonathan Baron, Cary Coglienese, Robert Hahn, Lisa Heinzerling, Christine
Jolls, Eric Posner, Richard Posner, and participants in a work-in-progress lunch at the University of
Chicago Law School for valuable suggestions on a previous draft.
1. Elizabeth Shogren, House Votes for Tougher Arsenic Rule; Measure OKs Clinton Water Standard,
CHI. TRIB., July 28, 2001, at I (quoting Rep. David Bonior).
2. ToxICOLOGY 178 (Hans Marquardt et al. eds., 1999) (quoting Isaac Newton) (internal references
omitted).
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Because the shape of the dose-response curve in the low-dose region cannot
be verified by measurement, there is no means to determine which shape is
correct.... [W]hen modeling the risks associated with lower doses, the
dose/risk range in which regulatory agencies and risk assessors are most
frequently interested, there is a wide divergence in the risk projected by
[different models, all of which fit existing.evidence.] ... In fact ... the risks
predicted by these ... models produce a 70,000-fold variation in the predicted
response.3
Additional epidemiological evaluations are needed to characterize the dose-
response relationship for arsenic-associated cancer and noncancer end points,
especially at low doses. Such studies are of critical importance for improving
the scientific validity of risk assessment.4
Anyone who's read an Agatha Christie mystery knows that arsenic is a
poison.
5
INTRODUCTION
Within the past two decades, cost-benefit analysis (CBA) has become one of
the most widely discussed topics in all of regulatory law. 6 Much of the
discussion is occurring within the three branches of government. The Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) has overseen a series of executive orders
calling for cost-benefit balancing,7 and OMB has attempted to give concrete
guidance for agencies to follow. 8 Courts have adopted a series of cost-benefit
default principles, authorizing agencies to engage in cost-benefit balancing
unless Congress requires otherwise. 9 Congress itself has shown considerable
interest in requiring agencies to compile information on the costs and benefits of
regulation.' ° At the same time, there has been renewed academic interest in
CBA, resulting in explorations of the technique from a remarkable variety of
3. PHILLIP L. WILLIAMS ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF TOXICOLOGY 456 (2000).
4. SUBCOMM. ON ARSENIC IN DRINKING WATER, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ARSENIC IN DRINKING WATER
3(1999).
5. 147 CONG. REC. H4751 (daily ed. July 27, 2001) (statement of Rep. Anna Eshoo).
6. For an overview, see COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPECTIVES
(Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner eds., 2001) [hereinafter COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS].
7. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,291,46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 17, 1980); Exec. Order No. 12,498,
50 Fed. Reg. 1036 (Jan. 4, 1985); Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993).
8. See OFFICE OF MGMT. AND BUDGET, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL REGULATION UNDER EXECUTIVE
ORDER 12866 (1996), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/riaguide.html. For a useful
overview, see Richard B. Stewart, A New Generation of Environmental Regulation?, 29 CAP. U. L. REV.
21, 29-34 (2001).
9. See Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1217 (5th Cir. 1991).
10. See, e.g., Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-26 (2000).
2256 [Vol. 90:2255
HeinOnline  -- 90 Geo. L.J. 2256 2001-2002
THE ARITHMETIC OF ARSENIC
perspectives. "
In all of these contexts, the discussion has tended to be quite abstract. Within
the legal culture, there has been little discussion of what CBA specifically
entails or of how the technique might be used or improved by agencies. 12 To
date, there appears to be no sustained investigation within the legal culture of
any regulation in which CBA proved pivotal to the outcome. In this Article, I
hope to begin to fill the gap. I do so by exploring one of the most contested
early decisions of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) under President
George W. Bush: the suspension of the EPA regulation of arsenic in drinking
water.' 3 Much of the contest over that decision has involved a debate about the
relevant costs and benefits of the regulation. As we will see, it is possible to
draw a range of general lessons from the arsenic controversy.
My principal finding is simple: Sometimes the best that can be done is to
specify an exceedingly wide "benefits range," one that does not do a great deal
to discipline judgment. Much of this Article will be devoted to establishing this
insufficiently appreciated point, with some effort to specify the judgments that
must be made both to identify the health benefits and to monetize them. As a
result of this finding, it would be wrong to have confidence that the EPA's
proposed rule in the Clinton Administration was either right or wrong, based on
the evidence before the agency at the time. I also offer three more positive
suggestions. First, CBA, even with wide ranges, provides an important improve-
ment over the "intuitive toxicology" of ordinary people, in which general affect
helps to determine judgment.' 4 This intuitive toxicology can lead people to
large blunders in thinking about risk, not excluding the public's excessive
reaction to the Bush Administration's decision to suspend the arsenic rule issued
by the Clinton Administration.- 5 Second, considerable progress could be made
by authorizing the EPA both to use market incentives and to target drinking
water controls to areas where they would do the most good. Third, the EPA
should be required to provide, if feasible, a distributional analysis showing
exactly who would be helped and hurt by regulation. In its voluminous materi-
als on the effects of the new arsenic rule, for example, the EPA does not say a
11. See generally COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS, supra note 6.
12. For a superb discussion of theoretical issues, see Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation,
Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the Discounting of Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 941 (1999).
13. National Primary Drinking Water Regulations, 66 Fed. Reg. 28,342 (May 22, 2001) (codified at
40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 141, 142) (delaying effective date). Note that throughout I will rely on the record
compiled by the EPA at the time that it made its decision; subsequent to that decision, new evidence has
been found and discussed, giving rise to increased fears about the risks posed by arsenic. See SUBCOMM.
ON ARSENIC IN DRINKING WATER, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ARSENIC IN DRINKING WATER: 2001 UPDATE. In
part as a result of this evidence, the EPA has decided to go forward with the Clinton Administration
initiative. See Katherine Q. Seelye, EPA to Adopt Clinton Arsenic Standard, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 2001,
at A18.
14. See PAUL SLOVIC, THE PERCEPTION OF RISK 285 (2000).
15. Id.
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word about whether poor people would bear the sometimes significant costs of
the regulation. It would be easier to assess the new rule with a clearer sense of
the benefited and burdened classes.
More particularly, I suggest that an understanding of the arsenic controversy
offers seven general lessons:
(1) The illusion of certainty. CBA can sometimes produce an illusion of
certainty.' 6 Even when, as in the arsenic case, science has a great deal to
offer, the most that the agency can be expected to do may be to specify a
range, sometimes a wide range, without assigning probabilities to various
points along the spectrum. This suggestion should be taken as an attack
not on CBA, but on what might be described as the false promise of
CBA: the thought that science and economics, taken together, can pro-
duce bottom lines to be mechanically applied by regulatory agencies.
"[T]here is wide recognition among experts-but not necessarily in the
public opinion-that current approaches to the regulation of most agents
remain judgmental." 17
(2) The wide benefits range. With respect to health benefits, plausible assump-
tions can lead in dramatically different directions. In the case of arsenic, it
would be possible to conclude that the annual number of lives saved from
the EPA's proposed regulation would be as low as 5 or as high as
112-and that the annual monetized benefits of the proposed standard
would be as high as $1.2 billion or as low as $10 million! It is worthwhile
to pay special attention to the dose-response curve, on which direct
information is typically absent. I will make a particular effort to connect
the legal and economic issues involved in cost-benefit balancing to the
underlying scientific questions.
(3) The potentially extraordinary power of creative lawyers. If literate in
some basic science and economics, an adroit lawyer, on either side, might
mount apparently reasonable challenges to any EPA decision about whether
and how to regulate arsenic in drinking water. An industry lawyer should
be able to urge, not without some force, that any new regulation of arsenic
is too severe, because the costs exceed the benefits. An environmental
lawyer should be able to urge, not without some force, that nearly any
imaginable regulation of arsenic is too lenient, because the benefits of
further regulation would exceed the costs. Both challenges would be
plausible for a simple reason: It is easy to identify assumptions that would
drive the numbers up or down. Hence one of my principal goals is to
provide a kind of primer on how informed lawyers can integrate science,
economics, and law to challenge regulatory outcomes.
16. This point is also pressed in Lisa Heinzerling, Regulatory Costs of Mythic Proportions, 107 YALE
L.J. 1981 (1998).
17. TOXICOLOGY, supra note 2, at 1145.
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(4) The need for judicial deference. In part because of point three, and in light
of the scientific and economic complexities, courts should play an exceed-
ingly deferential role in overseeing CBA at the agency level. To say the
least, judges are not specialists in the relevant topics, some of which are
highly technical, and because good lawyers will be able to raise so many
plausible doubts, the best judicial posture is one of deference. In the
arsenic case and in many other contexts, agencies must decide in the
midst of considerable scientific uncertainty and on the basis of judgments
of value on which reasonable people can differ. If agencies have been
both open and reasonable, the judicial role is at an end. It follows, for
example, that the Clinton Administration's arsenic rule, if it had been
finally issued and challenged, should have survived judicial review. It also
follows that a less stringent regulation, if it had been chosen by the Bush
Administration, should survive judicial review too. The claim for judicial
deference, in both cases, is rooted in institutional considerations and
above all a sense of the likely problems of intensive judicial review-not
in approval of any particular agency decision. Of course courts should
invalidate arbitrary or indefensible judgments, but the EPA's approach
here was neither arbitrary nor indefensible.
(5) CBA as indispensable information. The false precision of CBA is a
significant cautionary note, but it should not be taken as a fundamental
attack on the method itself, at least if CBA is understood as a way of
compiling relevant information. In the arsenic case, an assessment of
costs and benefits cannot determine the appropriate regulatory outcome.
But even so, the assessment is indispensable to informing the inquiry and
to ensuring that discretion is exercised in a way that is transparent rather
than opaque. Without some effort to ascertain the effects of regulation,
agencies are making a mere stab in the dark. At the very least, an
understanding of the data helps show exactly why the decision about how
to regulate arsenic is genuinely difficult-and why, and where, reasonable
people might differ. This is itself a significant gain.
(6) Targeting. The Safe Drinking Water Act (SDWA), 18 designed to control
pollution in drinking water, has been amended to require cost-benefit
balancing, partly to permit the EPA to relax regulatory requirements when
the benefits are low and the costs are high.' 9 At the same time, however,
the SDWA continues to have a high degree of rigidity. The EPA is not
authorized to impose regulation selectively or in those areas in which
regulation would do the most good; it is required to proceed with a
uniform, national regulation. 20 The EPA is also forbidden to create trad-
ing programs, which might well make best sense for some pollutants.
Statutory amendments would be sensible here, especially under a statute
18. 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to 300j-26 (2000).
19. See id. § 300g-l(b)(3)(C).
20. See id. § 300g. But see id. § 300g-4 to 300g-5.
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dedicated to cost-benefit balancing. Regulatory statutes generally should
authorize agencies to target regulations to areas where the benefits exceed
the costs and should also allow agencies to use market incentives when
appropriate.2 '
(7) The importance of distributional information. It would be extremely
valuable to assemble information about the distributional consequences
of regulation. The benefits of some regulations are enjoyed disproportion-
ately by people who are poor and members of minority groups.22 The
burdens of some regulations are imposed disproportionately on exactly
the same groups. To assess the arsenic rule, it would be highly desirable
to know whether poor people are mostly helped or mostly hurt. Would
they bear high costs? Would the regulation operate as a regressive tax?
Unfortunately, the EPA has not answered that question, though it would
almost certainly be easy for it to do so. Existing executive orders calling
for CBA should be amended to require a careful distributional analysis as
well.23
This Article comes in several parts. Part I offers a general overview of the
movement toward cost-benefit balancing, a movement in which the SDWA
stands as the most dramatic legislative endorsement. It also gives a brief
description of the public outcry over President Bush's decision to suspend the
regulation, to fortify the case for CBA. Part II provides a brief outline of the
SDWA and of the EPA's rationale in its regulation of arsenic. Part III explores
the very different analysis coming from the American Enterprise Institute-
Brookings (AEI-Brookings) Joint Center for Regulatory Studies. Part IV-in
many ways the heart of the Article-shows how apparently reasonable assump-
tions lead to a dramatically diverse set of benefit numbers, both monetized and
nonmonetized. Part V explores how lawyers and courts might respond to the
data. Part VI discusses the role of policymakers and explains that agencies
should be permitted to issue targeted regulations and to use economic incentives
and that, in keeping with its informational functions, CBA should include a
description of the expected winners and losers from regulation.
21. I do not explore here the question whether national standards make sense for drinking water, as
opposed to reliance on state regulation. For a pertinent discussion of this question, see Richard L.
Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553,
559-83 (2001).
22. See Matthew E. Kahn, The Beneficiaries of Clean Air Act Regulation, 24 REG. MAG. No. 1, at 22
(2001), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid= 267073.
23. See supra note 13. There is a brief reference to "distributive impacts" in Executive Order 12,866,
58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993). See also ABT Assocs., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ARSENIC IN
DRINKING WATER RULE: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 8-31 (2000) (analysis developed for EPA discussing need to
explore equitable and distributional considerations, including effects on poor and minority communi-
ties), available at www.epa.gov/safewater/ars/econ-analysis.pdf.
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I. INTUITIVE TOXICOLOGY AND THE COST-BENEFIT STATE
A. ARSENIC AND THE PUBLIC
My principal topic will be the contest over the appropriate analysis of
existing data relating to arsenic, but it will be useful to begin with a puzzle. In
April 2001, the Bush Administration suspended the Clinton Administration's
arsenic regulation after calling for further study.2 4 There seems to be little
question that of all the controversial environmental actions of the Bush Adminis-
tration's first year, the suspension of the arsenic rule produced the most intense
reaction.
A national survey, conducted between April 21 and April 26, 2001, found that
fifty-six percent of Americans rejected the Bush decision, whereas only thirty-
four percent approved of it-and that majorities of Americans opposed the
decision in every region of the nation. At various points, the public outcry
combined concern, certainty, and cynicism. "Arsenic Everywhere, and Bush is
Not Helping," according to one newspaper.2 6 "You may have voted for him, but
you didn't vote for this in your water," wrote the Wall Street Journal.2 7 In an
editorial, the New York Times demanded that "Americans should expect their
drinking water to be at least as safe as that of Japan, Jordan, Namibia and
Laos," all of which impose a 10 parts per billion (ppb) standard.2 8 A respected
journalist asked, "How callous can you get, Mr. Compassionate Conserva-
tive? '29 The public reaction came to a head during the legislative debates on the
issue, particularly within the House of Representatives, which voted to reinstate
the Clinton rule on the theory that arsenic "is a poison.' '3°
Here is the puzzle: With respect to arsenic, the underlying issues are highly
technical, and very few people are expert on the risks posed by exposure to low
levels of arsenic. What accounts for the public outcry? I believe that the reason
is simple: Arsenic was involved, and so was drinking water.
These two facts made the controversy seem highly accessible, and it was easy
to be outraged. Why was the Bush Administration allowing dangerously high
levels of arsenic to remain in drinking water? This appeared to be a rhetorical
question. By contrast, many environmental problems are both obscure and
24. See National Primary Drinking Water Regulations, 66 Fed. Reg. 16,134 (Mar. 23, 2001)
(codified at 40 C.ER. pts. 9, 141, 142) (delaying arsenic rule); 66 Fed. Reg. 20,579 (Apr. 23, 2001)
(ordering subsequent process).
25. See Mark Barabak, Bush Criticized As Fear of Environment Grows, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 30, 2001,
at A1.
26. Erik Olson, Arsenic Everywhere, and Bush Is Not Helping, BALT. SUN, May 14, 2001, at 9A.
27. John J. Fialka, Arsenic and Wild Space: Green Activists from Across Spectrum Unite Against
Bush, WALL ST. J., Apr. 11, 2001, at A20.
28. Robert K. Musil, Arsenic on Tap, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2001, at A18.
29. Michael Kinsley, Bush Decision on Arsenic Tough to Swallow, TIMES UNION, Apr. 16, 2001,
at A9.
30. 147 CONG. REC. H4727 (July 27, 2001).
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technical, and people do not have an easy or intuitive handle on them. Is carbon
dioxide a serious problem? Most people have no idea. But arsenic is well-
known, and it is well-known to be a poison, not least because of the exceedingly
popular movie, Arsenic and Old Lace.3 1 An influential environmental group, the
Natural Resources Defense Council, exploited exactly this reference with its
work on the arsenic problem, under the title, Arsenic and Old Laws. 32 The
public reaction would have been different if the controversy involved a water
contaminant with an obscure name, such as cadmium.
Ordinary people seem to be "intuitive toxicologists," with a set of simple
rules for thinking about environmental risks.33 Among those simple rules is a
belief that substances that cause cancer are unsafe and should be banned.34 That
intuitive toxicology does not easily make room for issues of degree. It does not
accommodate the judgment that low levels of admittedly carcinogenic sub-
stances should sometimes be tolerated because the risks are low and the costs of
eliminating them are high. It does not show an understanding of the different
imaginable dose-response curves and the possibility of safe thresholds or even
benefits from low exposure levels.
35
As part of intuitive toxicology, people rely on the "affect heuristic," through
which rapid, even automatic responses greatly affect judgments about risks.36
Consider, for example, the remarkable fact that stock prices increase signifi-
cantly on sunny days, a fact that is hard to explain in terms that do not rely on
affect.37 With respect to risks, affect often operates as a kind of mental shortcut,
substituting itself for a more careful inquiry into consequences.38 Something
very much of this sort has happened with the Bush Administration's suspension
of the arsenic standard, partly because of skepticism about President Bush, but
mostly because of the associations of arsenic. "If there is one thing we all seem
to agree on is that we do not want arsenic in our drinking water. It is an
extremely potent human carcinogen .... It is this simple: arsenic is a killer."
39
We could easily imagine public outrage over any decision to allow arsenic in
drinking water, even if the permissible level were exceedingly low. The outrage
would likely be promoted by cascade effects in which people's concern would
31. ARSENIC AND OLD LACE (Warner Bros. 1944).
32. PAUL MUSHAK, NATURAL RES. DEF. COUNCIL, ARSENIC AND OLD LAWS: A SCIENTIFIC AND PUBLIC
HEALTH ANALYSIS OF ARSENIC OCCURRENCE IN DRINKING WATER, ITS HEALTH EFFECTS, AND EPA's OUTr-
DATED ARSENIC TAP WATER STANDARD (2000), available at http://www.nrdc.org/water/drinking/arsenic/
exesum.asp.
33. See SLOVIC, supra note 14, at 285-314.
34. Id. at 291.
35. See Appendix.
36. See SLOVIC, supra note 14, at 413-27.
37. David A. Hirshleifer & Tyler G. Shumway, Good Day Sunshine: Stock Returns and the Weather
(2001), http://papers.ssrn.comlsol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=265674.
38. See SLOVIC, supra note 14, at 413-27.
39. 147 CONG. REC. H4744 (daily ed. July 27, 2001) (statement of Rep. Waxman).
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be heightened by the fact that other people were concerned. Indeed, the Bush
Administration's suspension of the arsenic rule seems to have created a cascade
effect in which many people objected to the suspension because other (reason-
able) people seemed to have objected.4° In fact one of the most compelling
arguments, within both the House of Representatives and the public at large,
was that other countries regulated arsenic at the level of stringency proposed in
the Clinton Administration.4 1 The practices of other countries seemed to operate
as a kind of mental shortcut, showing what it is right to do-notwithstanding
the reasonable questions that might be asked about the scientific bases for those
practices.
There is a deeper point here. The problems in intuitive toxicology and the
crudeness of the affect heuristic seem strongly to support the use of CBA,4 2
understood not as a way to stop regulation, but to ensure that when government
acts, it does so with some understanding of the likely consequences. CBA might
well be understood as a way of moving beyond intuitive toxicology toward a
form of toxicology that is actually supported by data. This point raises some
much larger issues, involving significant trends in the nature of government
regulation, to which I now turn.
B. THE EMERGING COST-BENEFIT STATE
More than any other federal statute, the SDWA, as a result of the 1996
amendments, reflects a strong commitment to cost-benefit balancing. The rise of
interest in cost-benefit balancing signals a dramatic shift from the initial stages
of national risk regulation. Those stages were undergirded by what might be
called "1970s environmentalism," which placed a high premium on immediate
responses to long-neglected problems, emphasized the existence of problems
rather than their magnitude, and was often rooted in moral indignation directed
at the behavior of those who created pollution and other risks to safety and
health.4 3 Important aspects of 1970s environmentalism can be found in the
apparently cost-blind national ambient air quality provisions of the Clean Air
Act44 and in statutory provisions requiring that standards be set by reference to
"the best available technology" without a requirement of cost-benefit balancing
or even an effort to quantify benefits.
45
It is clear that 1970s environmentalism has done a great deal of good. It has
40. See David Hirshleifer, The Blind Leading the Blind: Social Influence, Fads, and Informational
Cascades, in THE NEW ECONOMICS OF HUMAN BEHAVIOR 188 (Mariano Tommasi & Kathyrn Ierulli eds.,
1995).
41. See, e.g., 147 CONo. REC. H4743 (July 27, 2001) (statement of Rep. Bonior).
42. See Stephen F. Williams, Squaring the Vicious Circle, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 257, 260 (2001).
43. See Bruce Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law: The Democratic
Casefor Market Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 171, 172-75 (1988).
44. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b) (2000).
45. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(A) (2000); 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411(a)(1), 7412(d)(2), 7475(a)(4),
7502(c)( 1) (2000).
22632002]
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helped to produce dramatic improvements in many domains, above all in the
context of air pollution, where ambient air quality has improved for all major
pollutants.46 Indeed, 1970s environmentalism appears, by most accounts, to
survive cost-benefit balancing, producing aggregate benefits in the trillions of
dollars, well in excess of the aggregate Costs. 4 7 But even though the overall
picture is no cause for alarm, a closer look at federal regulatory policy shows a
wide range of problems.
Perhaps foremost is the problem of exceptionally poor priority-setting, with
substantial resources sometimes going to small problems and with little atten-
tion paid to some serious problems.48 The point has been dramatized by
repeated demonstrations that some regulations create significant substitute
risks49-and that with cheaper, more effective tools, regulation could achieve its
basic goals while saving billions of dollars.50 According to one study, each
embodying admittedly rough calculations, better allocations of health expendi-
tures could save 60,000 additional lives each year at no additional cost-and
better allocations could maintain the current level of lives saved with $31
billion in annual savings.51
In these circumstances, the most attractive parts of the movement for CBA
have not been rooted in especially controversial judgments about what govern-
ment ought to be doing. They have been rooted instead in a more mundane
search for pragmatic instruments designed to reduce the problems of poor
priority-setting, excessively costly tools, and inattention to the unfortunate
side-effects of regulation. By drawing attention to costs and benefits, it should
be possible to spur the most obviously desirable regulations, to deter the most
obviously undesirable ones, to encourage a broader view of consequences, and
to promote a search for least-cost methods of achieving regulatory goals.5z
Notice here that so defended, CBA is not only an obstacle to unjustified
regulation; it should be a spur to government as well, showing that regulation
should attend to neglected problems. If cost-benefit balancing is supported on
these highly pragmatic grounds, the central question is whether that form of
46. See Richard D. Morgenstern & Marc K. Landy, Economic Analysis: Benefits, Costs, Implica-
tions, in ECONOMIC ANALYSES AT EPA: ASSESSING REGULATORY IMPACT 455, 455-56 (Richard D. Morgen-
stern ed., 1997); Paul R. Portnoy, Air Pollution Policy, in PUBLIC POLICIES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL
PROTECTION 77, 101-05 (Paul R. Portnoy & Robert N. Stavins eds., 2000).
47. See Portnoy, supra note 46, at 101-05.
48. See STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 10-11,
18-23 (1993).
49. See RISK VERSUS RISK: TRADEOFFS IN PROTECTING HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT (John D. Graham
& Jonathan Baert Wiener eds., 1995).
50. See, e.g., A. DENNY ELLERMAN ET AL., MARKETS FOR CLEAN AIR: THE U.S. ACID RAIN PROGRAM
253-56 (2000); Robert N. Stavins, Market-Based Environmental Policies, in PUBLIC POLICIES FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION, supra note 46, at 31, 35-55.
51. See Tammy 0. Tengs et al., Five-Hundred Life-Saving Interventions and Their Cost-
Effectiveness, 15 RISK ANALYSIS 369 (1995).
52. For many examples, see ECONOMIC ANALYSES AT EPA, supra note 46.
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balancing is actually producing what can be taken as policy improvements by
people with diverse views about appropriate policy.
On these counts, the record of CBA-at least within the EPA-is generally
encouraging. 53 Assessments of costs and benefits has, for example, helped
produce more stringent and rapid regulation of lead in gasoline, promoted more
stringent regulation of lead in drinking water, led to stronger controls on air
pollution at the Grand Canyon and the Navajo Generating Station, and produced
a reformulated gasoline rule that promotes stronger controls on air pollutants.54
In these areas, CBA, far from being only a check on regulation, has indeed
spurred government attention to serious problems.
CBA has also led to regulations that accomplish statutory goals at lower cost, or
that do not devote limited private and public resources to areas where they are
unlikely to do much good. For regulation of sludge, protection of farm workers, water
pollution regulation for the Great Lakes, and controls on organic chemicals, CBA
helped regulators produce modifications that significantly reduced costs.55 With re-
spect to asbestos, an analysis of benefits and costs led the EPA to tie the schedule
for phasing down (and eventually largely eliminating) asbestos to the costs of substi-
tutes and also to exempt certain products from a flat ban.5 6 With respect to lead in
gasoline and control of chlorofluorocarbons (destructive of the ozone layer), CBA
helped promote the use of economic incentives rather than command-and-control
regulation.57 In this case, economic incentives are much cheaper and make more
stringent regulation possible in the first place. For modem government, one of the
most serious problems appears to be not agency use of CBA, but frequent noncompli-
ance with executive branch requirements that agencies engage in such analysis.
58
Of course, CBA is hardly uncontroversial.5 9 Insofar as both costs and benefits
are measured by the economic criterion of "private willingness to pay," there
are many problems. Poor people often have little ability and hence little
willingness to pay. Some people will be inadequately informed and hence show
unwillingness to pay for benefits that would make their lives go better.6°
Perhaps regulatory agencies should seek not private willingness to pay, but
public judgments as expressed in public arenas.6 ' Society is not best taken as
53. See id.
54. See Morgenstern & Landy, supra note 46, at 457-58.
55. See id. at 458.
56. See id.
57. See James K. Hammitt, Stratospheric-Ozone Depletion, in ECONOMIC ANALYSES AT EPA, supra
note 46, at 131; Albert L. Nichols, Lead in Gas, in ECONOMIC ANALYSES AT EPA, supra note 46, at 49.
58. See Robert W. Hahn & Cass R. Sunstein, A New Executive Order for Improving Federal
Regulation? Deeper and Wider Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1489, 1489-90 (2002).
59. For a general challenge to quantification, see Heinzerling, supra note 16.
60. See Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit Analysis When Preferences
Are Distorted, in COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS, supra note 6, at 269, 292-94.
61. Many of these points are pressed in ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS
204-10 (1993).
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some maximizing machine in which aggregate output is all that matters. Some-
times a regulation producing $5 million in benefits but $6 million in costs will
be worthwhile, if those who bear the costs (perhaps representing dollar losses
alone?) can do so easily, and if those who receive the benefits (perhaps
representing lives and illnesses averted?) are especially needy.
In view of these problems, the strongest arguments for cost-benefit balancing
are based not only-or even mostly--on neoclassical economics, but also on an
understanding of human cognition, on democratic considerations, and on an
assessment of the real-world record of such balancing.6 2 All of these points are
directly relevant to the arsenic controversy. Begin with cognition: Ordinary
people have difficulty calculating probabilities, and they tend to rely on rules of
thumb, or heuristics, that can lead them to make systematic errors.6 3 CBA is a
natural corrective here. Because of intense emotional reactions to particular
incidents, people often make mistakes in thinking about the seriousness of
certain risks. 64 Cost-benefit balancing should help government resist demands
for regulation that are rooted in misperceptions of facts. Unless people are asked
to seek a full accounting, they are likely to focus on small parts of problems,
producing inadequate or even counterproductive solutions.65 CBA is a way of
producing that full accounting.
With respect to democracy, the case for CBA is strengthened by the fact that
interest-groups are often able to use these cognitive problems strategically, thus
fending off regulation that is desirable or pressing for regulation when the
argument on its behalf is fragile.6 6 Here CBA, taken as an input into decisions,
can protect democratic processes by exposing an account of consequences to
public view. With respect to pragmatic considerations, a review of the record
suggests that cost-benefit balancing leads to improvements, not on any controver-
sial view of how to value the goods at stake, but simply because such balancing
can lead to more stringent regulation of serious problems, less costly ways of
achieving regulatory goals, and a reduction in expenditures for problems that
are, by any account, relatively minor.67 All of these points help explain the
content of the SDWA, as we shall now see.
62. I attempt to develop this point in Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J.
LEGAL STUD. 1059, 1103 (2000). In the same vein, see Allan Gibbard, Risk and Value, in VALUES AT
RISK 94-112 (Douglas MacLean ed., 1986).
63. See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, in
JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: HEURISTICS AND BIASES 3, 11 (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982); see
generally Roger G. Noll & James E. Krier, Some Implications of Cognitive Psychology for Risk
Regulation, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 747 (1990).
64. See George F. Loewenstein et al., Risk As Feelings, 127 PSYCHOL. BULL. 267, 272-79 (2001).
65. See DIETRICH DORNER, THE LOGIC OF FAILURE: RECOGNIZING AND AVOIDING ERROR IN COMPLEX
SITUATIONS 186 (1996).
66. See Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L.
REV. 683, 724-29 (1999).
67. See Morgenstern & Landy, supra note 46, at 457-59.
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II. DRINKING WATER: CONGRESS AND THE EPA
A. STATUTORY BACKGROUND
Regulatory statutes typically instruct agencies to require as much as "fea-
sible ' 68 or to "protect the public health. ' 69 Only a few such statutes expressly
require agency decisions to turn on cost-benefit balancing.70 The SDWA is an
intriguing hybrid, combining an analysis of public health and feasibility with
reference to CBA as well. Indeed, the cost-benefit provisions of the SDWA go
as far as any other federal statute in requiring close attention to costs and benefits, and
because Congress has been quite interested in imposing more general cost-
benefit requirements,7 ' the SDWA might well be a harbinger of the future. For
this reason alone, the implementation of the statute is worth careful attention.
More particularly, the SDWA asks the EPA to proceed in three steps. First, the
EPA is asked to set "maximum contaminant level goals" (MCLG) for water
pollutants.72 The goals must be set "at the level at which no known or
anticipated adverse effects on the health of persons occur and which allows an
adequate margin of safety. ' 73 In practice, this statutory standard will frequently
call for a MCLG of zero because many contaminants cannot be shown to have
safe thresholds and because the "adequate margin of safety" language will, in
these specific circumstances, seem to support a zero MCLG. 4 Second, the EPA
is told to specify "a maximum contaminant level [MCL] for such contaminant
which is as close to the maximum contaminant level goal as is feasible."75 The
statute defines feasible (not terribly helpfully) to mean "feasible with the use of
the best technology, treatment techniques and other means which the [EPA]
finds .. . are available.",76 Third, the EPA is required to undertake a risk
assessment for pollutants, discussing the level of the danger and the costs of
achieving the requisite reduction. 7 The risk assessment is supposed to give an
account, for the MCL being considered and for all alternative levels being
68. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5) (2000) ("feasible"); 42 U.S.C. §§ 7521 (a)(3)(A) (2000) ("will
be available"), 7412(d)(2) (2000) ("achievable"), 7411(a)(1) (2000) ("has been adequately demon-
strated").
69. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2000).
70. See, e.g., Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (2000); Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-1 36 y (2000).
71. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, FREE MARKETS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 356-65 (1997).
72. 42 U.S.C. § 300g-l(b)(4)(A) (2000).
73. Id.
74. See Drinking Water Regulations, 56 Fed. Reg. 26,460 (June 7, 1991) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts.
141, 142) (establishing a goal of zero for lead); National Primary Drinking Water Regulations, 66 Fed.
Reg. 6976 (Jan. 22, 2001) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 141, 142) (establishing a goal of zero for
arsenic). But see Chlorine Chemistry Council v. EPA, 206 F.3d 1286 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (invalidating a
chloroform regulation on ground that setting a MCLG of zero was arbitrary and capricious).
75. 42 U.S.C. § 300g-l(b)(4)(B).
76. Id. § 300g- I (b)(4)(D).
77. Id. § 300g-I (b)(3).
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considered, of the "[q]uantifiable and nonquantifiable health risk reduction
benefits for which there is a factual basis in the rulemaking record"; 78 the
"[q]uantifiable and nonquantifiable CoStS"; 7 9 the "incremental costs and benefits
associated with each alternative";80 and "[a]ny increased health risk that may
occur as the result of compliance, including risks associated with co-occurring
contaminants."
8
'
The risk assessment is no mere disclosure provision. The SDWA expressly
permits-but does not require-the EPA to set a MCL at a level other than the
feasible level if it determines that the benefits of that level "would not justify
the costs of complying with the level. ' 8 2 On the basis of that determination, the
EPA is permitted to set a maximum level "that maximizes health risk reduction
benefits at a cost that is justified by the benefits. 83 Courts are authorized to
review the EPA's judgment about whether the benefits of a certain level justify
the costs, but only by asking whether that judgment is "arbitrary and capri-
CiOHS.,,84
What does all this mean? The SDWA is quite different from the Toxic
Substances Control Act (TSCA), which expressly requires the EPA to base
decisions on a simple comparison of costs and benefits.85 The SDWA is more
indirect, even circuitous, in its endorsement of cost-benefit requirements. But
the difference between the SDWA and the TSCA is more apparent than real. In
regulating contaminants in drinking water, the EPA is required to show that its
judgment about cost-benefit balancing is not "arbitrary," and this standard is
essentially the same as applied under the TSCA.8 6 Perhaps the SDWA gives the
EPA somewhat more room for the exercise of discretion. But at most, the
difference is one of degree. It is clear that courts are authorized to invalidate an
arbitrary or unreasoned assessment on the cost or benefit side or on the question
of whether the benefits justify the costs. As we shall see, this point raises many
questions for the future.
B. ARSENIC AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
Arsenic is commonly found in nature as a part of the mineral compound
arsenopyrite.87 As a result of soil and rock erosion, arsenic is released into the
78. Id. § 300g-l(b)(3)(C)(i)(I).
79. Id. § 300g- I (b)(3)(C)(i)(l1l).
80. Id. § 300g-l(b)(3)(C)(i)(IV).
81. Id. § 300g-l(b)(3)(C)(i)(VI).
82. Id. § 300g-l(b)(6)(A).
83. Id.
84. Id. § 300g-I (b)(6)(D).
85. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692; see also Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir.
1991).
86. See Corrosion Proof Fittings, 947 F.2d 1201.
87. See Karen Breslin, Removing Arsenic from Drinking Water, 106 ENvTL. HEALTH PERSP. A548
(Nov. 1998), available at http://ehpnetl.niehs.nih.gov/docs/1998/106-1 1/innovations-abs.html.
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water supply, where it can be found in many regions, including New England,
eastern Michigan, and the southwestern United States.88 It has long been known
that arsenic can be toxic, 89 even carcinogenic, 90 and since 1942, the EPA has
had in place an arsenic regulation calling for an MCL of 50 ppb.91 But in the
past decades, some evidence has suggested that arsenic may have significant
adverse effects at levels well below the 50 ppb standard. The principal evidence
comes from epidemiological studies in Chile, Argentina, and above all Taiwan.
The evidence from these studies suggests that exposure levels of 300 to 600 ppb
cause significant increases of various cancers and other adverse effects.9 2 These
levels are of course far higher than 50 ppb; but if we extrapolate from the risk at
high levels to what might well happen at lower levels, there could be serious
reason for concern. I will return to this point shortly.
In 1996, Congress directed the EPA to propose a new standard for arsenic by
January 1, 2000.9 At the same time, Congress told the National Academy of
Sciences and the EPA to study the health effects of arsenic in order to assist the
rulemaking effort.94 In 1996, the EPA requested that the National Research
Council (NRC) of the National Academy of Sciences conduct an independent
review of arsenic toxicity data and recommend changes to the EPA's arsenic
criteria. 95 In its 1999 report, the NRC located few studies that examined arsenic
effects at low-level concentrations and even fewer studies in agreement.96 A
1995 Japanese study found cancer mortality near or below expectation among
persons exposed to arsenic in drinking water at less than 50 ppb.97 Domestic
research in the same year revealed no association between bladder cancer risk
and arsenic exposure, where eighty-one of eighty-eight Utah towns (ninety-two
percent) had concentrations below 10 ppb, and only one town exceeded the 50
ppb standard.98 A 1999 assessment of Utah mortality rates, which the EPA
described as "the best U.S. study currently available," 99 found no increased
88. Id.
89. For recent overviews, see Knashawn H. Morales et al., Risk of Internal Cancers from Arsenic in
Drinking Water, 108 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 655 (July 2000), at http://ehpnetl.niehs.nih.gov/docs/2000/
108p655-661morales/abstract.html.
90. See SUBCOMM. ON ARSENIC IN DRINKING WATER, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 4, at 83.
91. National Primary Drinking Water Regulations, 66 Fed. Reg. 6976, 6977-79 (Jan. 22, 2001)
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 141, 142).
92. See id. at 7001-03.
93. 42 U.S.C. § 300g- (b)(12)(iv) (2000).
94. Id. § 300g-l(b)(12)(A)(ii).
95. See SUBCOMM. ON ARSENIC IN DRINKING WATER, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 4, at 1-3.
96. Id. at 83-130.
97. Toshihide Tsuda, et al., Ingested Arsenic and Internal Cancer: A Historical Cohort Study
Followed for 33 Years, 141 AM. J. EPIDEMIOLOGY 198, 206 (1995); see also SUBCOMM. ON ARSENIC IN
DRINKING WATER, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 4, at 99 (finding results statistically unstable).
98. Michael N. Bates et al., Case-Control Study of Bladder Cancer and Arsenic in Drinking Water,
141 AM. J. EPIDEMIOL. 523, 525-26 (1995).
99. National Primary Drinking Water Regulations, 66 Fed. Reg. 6976, 7002 (Jan. 22, 2001) (codified
at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 141, 142).
22692002]
HeinOnline  -- 90 Geo. L.J. 2269 2001-2002
THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL
bladder or lung cancer risks after exposure to arsenic levels of 14 to 166 ppb per
liter. °° More recent studies in Finland and Taiwan, however, linked increased
risks of bladder cancer and cerebrovascular disease to groundwater arsenic
consumption as low as 0.1 to 50 ppb.' 0 ' The Taiwan study, with its significant
population base, seemed especially impressive. 0 2
These results could have led the NRC in several different directions. It would not
have been entirely astonishing for the NRC to find that the evidence was too
inconclusive to support a new rule. Nonetheless, the NRC concluded that the
Taiwan studies provided the best available evidence on human health effects of
arsenic. 103 The NRC used linear extrapolations from these data to obtain cancer
risks at exposure levels below 50 ppb per liter and subsequently recommended
that the EPA should significantly lower its current standard.' °4 Indeed, the NRC
concluded that "considering the data on bladder and lung cancer noted in the
studies ... a similar approach for all cancers could easily result in a combined cancer
risk on the order of 1 in 100" from exposure at 50 ppb.'0 5 The 1 in 100 risk figure
is a special source of concern because the EPA is usually attentive to environmental
risks at or below 1 in 1 million,' °6 and a risk of t in 100 seems plainly intolerable.
Critics attacked the NRC's recommendation on the grounds that Taiwanese
cooking and health practices put Taiwanese citizens at greater risk for arsenic
toxicity than Americans, as demonstrated by the absence of a single report of
U.S. arsenic-induced cancer.' 0 7 The Taiwanese population is much poorer than
the American population and suffers from a number of dietary and nutritional
deficiencies, including a higher intake of arsenic from food and a deficiency in
selenium, zinc, and vitamin B 12, all of which can reduce the toxicity of arsenic.
Animal studies even suggest the possibility that arsenic may be a nutritional
requirement, though there is insufficient data to indicate any nutritional role in
human health.' 0 8 Despite these criticisms, the EPA relied heavily upon the
NRC's scientific conclusions when redeveloping its current MCL.
100. Denise Riedel Lewis et al., Drinking Water Arsenic in Utah: A Cohort Mortality Study, 107
ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 359, 362 (1999), available at http://ehpnetl.niehs.nih.gov/docs/1999/107p359-
365lewis/abstract.html. The EPA discounted these results in its final MCL report based upon the already
low cancer rates of the subject population when compared to the entire state.
101. H.Y. Chiou et al., Arsenic Methylation Capacity, Body Retention, and Null Genotypes of
Glutathione S-transferase Mi and T1 Among Current Arsenic-Exposed Residents in Taiwan, 386
MuTAT. RES. 197, 198 (1997); Paivi Kurttio et al., Arsenic Concentrations in Well Water and Risk of
Bladder and Kidney Cancer in Finland, 107 ENVTL. HEALTH PERSP. 705 (1999), available at http://
ehpnetl .niehs.nih.gov/docs/1999/107p7O5 
-710kurttio/abstract.html.
102. SUBCOMM. ON ARSENIC IN DRINKING WATER, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 4, at 17.
103. Id. at 7.
104. Id. at 8-9.
105. See ABT ASSOCIATES, supra note 23, at 1-1 (quoting NRC report).
106. See ROBERT PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 442 (3d ed. 2000).
107. See Sue E. Umshler, When Arsenic is Safer in Your Cup of Tea Than in Your Local Water
Treatment Plant, 39 NAT. RESOURCES J. 565, 589-92 (1999); see also National Primary Drinking Water
Regulations, 66 Fed. Reg. 6976, 7003-04 (Jan. 22, 2001) (codified at 40 C.ER. pts. 9, 141, 142).
108. Umshler, supra note 107, at 587.
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In 2000, the EPA issued a proposed regulation setting an MCLG of 0 ppb, on
the ground that no safe level could be identified; an MCL of 3 ppb, on the
ground that this was the lowest feasible level; and a regulatory ceiling of 5 ppb,
on the ground that the CBA justified this approach but not any more stringent
mandate.' 0 9 The EPA also requested comments on regulatory ceilings of 3, 10,
and 20 ppb, for which it provided accounts of both benefits and costs. On
January 22, 2001, the EPA issued a final rule that essentially embodied the same
analysis as the proposal, but with a crucial change to a regulatory ceiling of 10
ppb rather than 5 ppb." 0 The EPA urged that its assessment of costs and benefits
for the four different levels of stringency justified the 10 ppb level."' The rule
was to become effective on March 23, 2001, with a compliance date of January
23, 2006. 12
1. Costs
The new regulation would have required several thousand water systems-
serving about 10 million people-to install new equipment.1 3 The overall cost
of the 10 ppb standard would have been about $206 million.' 14 This aggregate
figure is not entirely informative because the additional payments would vary
considerably across the nation. For most households, the annual increase in
water bills would be in the range of $30." 5 Water systems with 500 or fewer
customers, however, would face significantly higher costs, ranging up to $325
per household." 16 These water systems represent a small fraction of the total
number of people affected by arsenic, and they tend to involve rural communi-
ties.
As it was required to do, the EPA also calculated the costs of alternative
levels of regulation. A 20 ppb standard would cost about $70 million; a 5 ppb
standard, $470 million; and a 3 ppb standard, $790 million." 17 Here, too, the
disaggregated figures are important. The most stringent standard of 3 ppb would
cost an average of $41 per affected household, while the 20 ppb standard would
cost about an average of $24." 8 At the extremes, the 20 ppb standard is actually
more expensive ($351) than the 3 ppb standard ($317), because of the particular
control technologies that would be involved. 1 9 Consider the following summary:
109. National Primary Drinking Water Regulations, 65 Fed. Reg. 38,888 (proposed June 22, 2000).
110. National Primary Drinking Water Regulations, 66 Fed. Reg. 6976, 6981 (Jan. 22, 2001)
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 141, 142).
111. Id. at 6979.
112. Id. at 6976.
113. Id.
114. Id. at 7010.
115. Id. at 7011.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 7010.
118. Id. at 7011.
119. Id.
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Table 1
Mean Annual Costs Per Household 120
(in 1999 dollars)
System Size 3 ppb 5 ppb 10 ppb 20 ppb
Less than 100 317 318.26 326.82 351.15
101-500 166.91 164.02 162.50 166.72
501-1000 74.81 73.11 70.72 68.24
1001-3300 63.76 61.94 58.24 54.36
3301-10,000 42.84 40.18 37.71 34.63
10,001-50,000 38.40 36.07 32.37 29.05
50,001-100,000 31.63 29.45 24.81 22.64
100,001-1,000,000 25.29 23.34 20.52 19.26
More than 1,000,000 7.41 2.79 0.86 0.15
All categories 41.34 36.95 31.85 23.95
The EPA did not offer a population-wide breakdown to show the numbers of
people served by the various system sizes and to examine whether the people
who would bear the costs could do so easily or with difficulty. One analysis,
admittedly from a group with a particular point of view, suggests that eighty-
seven percent of people who consume arsenic at a significant level in their tap
water (over 1 ppb) are served by systems serving more than 10,000 custom-
ers. 12' This data suggests that almost nine out of ten of the people who will have
to pay for water technology would face annual increases of less than $30-not
entirely trivial perhaps, but certainly not a huge expenditure.
2. Benefits
Within the EPA, the much harder issues involved the benefits of the 10 ppb
requirement.' 2 2 The most easily quantified benefits involve prevented cases of
bladder and lung cancer; here the epidemiological data, mostly from Taiwan,
allowed quantitative estimates to be made.' 2 3 For two reasons, however, even
these estimates should be taken with some grains of salt. The first reason is that
there are differences between the population of Taiwan and that of the United
States.' 24 The second reason is that a great deal turns on the nature of the
120. Id.
121. MUSHAK, supra note 32, at ch. 3.
122. I emphasize that I am dealing here with the evidence at the time of the decision and that
subsequent evidence appears to have strengthened the case for stringent regulation. See SUBCOMM. ON
ARSENIC IN DRINKING WATER, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 13.
123. 66 Fed. Reg. at 7001-04.
124. Id. at 7003-04.
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dose-response curve. If the curve is "linear," meaning that cancer cases do not
drop sharply at low exposure levels, many more cancers will be predicted than
if the curve is "sublinear," meaning that after exposure declines to a certain
level, the number of cancer cases drops off. 125 Lacking any data on the
question, the EPA decided to assume that the dose-response curve is linear,
noting that "[t]he use of a linear procedure to extrapolate from a higher,
observed data range to a lower range beyond observation is a science policy
approach that has been in use by Federal agencies for four decades."' 26 The
EPA added that the policy objectives were "to avoid underestimating risk in
order to protect public health and be consistent and clear across risk assess-
ments."' 127 From these remarks, it seems clear that the default assumption of
linearity is not based on science-which cannot produce a standard default
assumption-but on a policy judgment, designed to err on the side of protecting
health by ensuring against underestimation of the risks. I will return to this
important issue below. 1
28
Armed with the assumption of linearity, the EPA thought that estimates were
feasible for bladder and lung cancer and calculated bladder and lung cancer
risks using the analysis of the NRC. 129 The NRC used the Taiwan data to
calculate a I to 1.5 per 1000 lifetime risk of male fatal bladder cancer at the
current 50 ppb standard; it also examined the Chile and Argentina studies and
concluded the rates of cancer were comparable to the Taiwan data.' 30 The EPA
assessed lung cancer risks, which are known to be two to five times greater than
bladder cancer risks, but for many of the health effects from arsenic, the EPA
concluded that quantification was impossible.'
3
'
a. Lives and Health: Quantities. The EPA estimated that the 10 ppb require-
ment would prevent twenty-one to thirty cancer deaths and sixteen to twenty-six
cases of curable cancer.' 32 By comparison, a 20 ppb requirement would prevent
ten to eleven deaths and nine curable cancers; a 5 ppb requirement, twenty-nine
to fifty-four deaths and twenty-two to forty-seven curable cancers; and a 3 ppb
125. Id. at 7004.
126. Id. In selecting its dose-response model, the EPA examined a 2000 study by Morales which
presented ten potential dose-response models based upon interpretations of the original Taiwan data.
Morales et al., supra note 89. The EPA rejected those models with a comparison population because
they resulted in supralinear dose-response relationships (higher than a linear response). 66 Fed. Reg. at
7006. The EPA concluded that there was no basis for this type of relationship because the NRC report
had concluded that the dose-response relationship for arsenic at low levels should be either linear or
sublinear, with a preference for the latter. Id. The EPA chose the linear model based upon the
above-mentioned policies. These various points are treated in detail below.
127. 66 Fed. Reg. at 7004.
128. See discussion infra section IV.A. I.
129. 66 Fed. Reg. at 7006.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 7006, 7011.
132. Id. at 7009.
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requirement, thirty-three to seventy-four cancer deaths and twenty-five to sixty-
four curable cancers. 133 Consider the following table:
Table 2
Annual Total of Bladder and Lung Cancer Cases Avoided 134
Arsenic Level Reduced Reduced Total Cancer
(ppb) Mortality Cases Morbidity Cases Cases Avoided
3 32.6-74.1 24.6-64.2 57.2-138.3
5 29.1-53.7 22.0-46.5 51.1-100.2
10 21.3-29.8 16.1-25.9 37.4-55.7
20 10.2-11.3 8.5-8.8 19.0-19.8
b. Lives and Health: No Quantities. The EPA also concluded that the 10 ppb
standard would produce "important non-quantified benefits .... Chief among
these are certain health impacts known to be caused by arsenic, though, while
they may be substantial, the extent to which these impacts occur at levels below
50 [ppb] is unknown." 135
The relevant effects include several kinds of cancer: skin, kidney, liver,
prostate, and nasal passages.' 3 6 They also include pulmonary, cardiovascular,
immunological, neurological, and endocrine effects. 137 To these health effects,
the EPA added that there would be other benefits that would defy quantification.
Among these benefits is "the effect on those systems that install treatment
technologies that can address multiple contaminants."'' 38 Some of the technolo-
gies that would reduce arsenic levels would also remove "many other contami-
nants that [the] EPA is in the process of regulating or considering regulating." 139
c. Converting Quantities to Dollars. To compare the quantified benefits of
regulation with the $206 million cost, the EPA was required to engage in several
exercises in conversion. With respect to lives saved, the EPA used a value of a
statistical life of $6.1 million.' 40 That figure was derived by calculating the
average of over two dozen studies, conducted mostly in the 1970s and generally
designed to show how much an employer had to pay employees to compensate
for a statistical risk of death. 14' By multiplying the number of expected mortali-
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 7012.
136. Id. at 7011.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 7012.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id.
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ties by $6.1 million, the EPA obtained most of the "dollar value" of the arsenic
regulation. 142
As noted, however, many of the cancers caused by arsenic are not fatal. For a
nonfatal cancer, the EPA used a figure of $607,000.143 This figure does not
come from measurements of people's willingness to pay to reduce a statistical
risk of nonfatal cancer, but instead-and somewhat astonishingly 144-from
shoppers' responses to hypothetical questions about how much they would be
willing to pay to reduce a statistical risk of chronic bronchitis. 145 Apparently,
the EPA thought that this was the closest available analogue to a nonfatal cancer.
3. Summary of the EPA's Analysis
The EPA's basic analysis is captured in the following table.
Table 3
Estimated Benefits from Reducing Arsenic in Drinking Water 46
(millions of 1999 dollars)
Total Quantified Health Potential Nonquantified
Arsenic Level Benefits, in Millions Health Benefits
(ppb) (Lower and Upper Bounds) (Applies to All Levels)
3 $213.8-$490.9 Skin cancer, kidney cancer
Cancer of nasal passages,
5 $191.1-$355.6 liver cancer
Prostate cancer, cardiovascular
10 $139.6-$197.7 effects
Pulmonary, neurological,
20 $66.2-$75.3 endocrine effects
The monetized costs of the 10 ppb standard are between $2 million and $60
million higher than the monetized benefits-and the overall benefits are in line
with overall costs only at the 20 ppb level. 147 The EPA was well aware of this
point. Nonetheless, it concluded that once the nonquantified benefits of the 10
ppb standard were included, the costs would be well justified. The cost per
cancer case avoided for the final rule would be between $3.2 million and $4.8
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. The EPA's decision to this effect is sharply criticized in ARSENIC RULE BENEFITS REVIEW PANEL,
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ARSENIC RULE BENEFITS ANALYSIS: AN SAB REVIEW 17 (2001), available at
www.epa.gov/sab/pdf/ec01008.pdf, suggesting an upper bound of $3.6 million and a lower bound of
$607,000; the use of the $3.6 million upper bound would dramatically alter the calculation.
145. 66 Fed. Reg. at 7012.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 7017.
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million-hardly an extraordinary price to pay, and far lower than the $5 million
to $12.2 million range produced by a 3 ppb standard. 148
III. PEER REVIEW? ARSENIC AT AEI-BROOKINGS
The EPA's conclusion was sharply criticized by a widely reported paper from
the AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies. 149 The authors, Jason
Burnett and Robert Hahn, concluded that the costs of the rule would exceed the
benefits by about $190 million each year and hence that the rule deserved
membership in the Joint Center's' "$100 million club," which includes regula-
tions that cost at least $100 million more than they promise to deliver. For two
reasons, the Burnett-Hahn study is worth close attention. First, the AEI-
Brookings Joint Center is highly respected for its careful work on CBA, and Hahn is
an especially able and influential observer of the regulatory process. 15 Second,
the disagreements between the EPA and the Joint Center provide a great deal of
information about the nature of CBA itself and the likely nature of legal challenges to
such analysis by federal agencies. Burnett and Hahn raised no questions about
the EPA's finding of a $200 million cost to the arsenic rule. Instead, they made
several key adjustments to the EPA's calculation of benefits. The first set of
adjustments involved the actual number of cancer cases to be prevented. The
second set involved the translation of that figure into a dollar number.
To calculate cancer cases, Burnett and Hahn made two changes. First, they
attempted to quantify the "nonquantifiable benefits" by multiplying the EPA's
estimate of twenty-eight lives saved by two, for a total of fifty-six.)5' They
reasoned that "including 'nonquantifiable risks' would increase the lives-saved
estimate by some factor between one and four."' 52 This number came from the
report of the NRC, which suggests that the risk of death from all kinds of cancer
might be eight times the risk of bladder cancers. Recognizing that the EPA's
quantified figure represents both bladder and lung cancers, Burnett and Hahn
took a multiple of four as producing a "reasonable upper bound" of 112; but
they decided to use the fifty-six estimate because it seemed more reasonable. 1
53
Second, Burnett and Hahn divided their chosen number of fifty-six by five to
reflect their judgment that the risk of arsenic is not linearly related to arsenic
concentrations. They explained that "[t]his assumption is not realistic because
the human body can metabolize arsenic at low levels, rendering it nontoxic."'
' 54
148. Id. at7018.
149. See JASON K. BURNETT & ROBERT W. HAHN, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE-BROOKINGS JOINT
CENTER FOR REGULATORY STUDIES, EPA's ARSENIC RULE: THE BENEFITS OF THE STANDARD Do NOT JUSTIFY
THE COSTS (2001), available at http://aei.brookings.org/admin/pdffiles/reg-analysis-01-02.pdf. Note
that I serve on the advisory board of the Joint Center.
150. See e.g., RISKS, COSTS, AND LIVES SAVED (Robert W. Hahn ed., 1997).
151. BURNETT & HAHN, supra note 149, at 7.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at5.
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(Note that the EPA concluded that recent research has drawn into doubt the
claim that the metabolized forms of arsenic are any less toxic. 155) According to
Burnett and Hahn, the upshot is that the new regulation would save about
eleven lives annually. 1
56
To translate this amount into dollar terms, Burnett and Hahn adjusted the $6.1
million figure downward. They emphasized that cancer follows exposure to arsenic
not immediately but only after a latency period ranging from ten to forty years.
57
Burnett and Hahn use a seven percent discount rate on the theory that "future benefits
should be discounted just as future costs are." 15 8 As a result of the adjustment, the
value of a statistical life fell to $1.1 million. Sharply disagreeing with the National
Research Council's and the EPA's projected risk of 1 in 100, Burnett and Hahn
added that "the risk reduction is about 1 in 1 million, which is so small as not to be
worth addressing, given the uncertainties in the data and the EPA's limited resources
to develop regulations."' 59 Burnett and Hahn concluded that no plausible version of
the arsenic proposal going beyond the existing 50 ppb standard could be justified on
cost-benefit grounds. Here is their overview:
Table 4
AEI-Brookings Joint Center Estimates' 60
Lives
Saved Benefits Costs Net Costs
EPA's Model Without
Accounting for Latency 28 $170 million $210 million $40 million
EPA's Model Accounting
for Latency 28 $50 million $210 million $160 million
Our High Estimate 110 $200 million $210 million $10 million
Our Best Estimate 11 $23 million $210 million $190 million
Our Low Estimate 5.5 $10 million $210 million $200 million
155. See National Primary Drinking Water Regulations, 66 Fed. Reg. 6976, 7000 (Jan. 22,
2001) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 141, 142); H. Vasken Aposhian et al., Occurrence of
Monomethylarsonous Acid in Urine of Humans Exposed to Inorganic Arsenic, 13 CHEMICAL RES.
ToxlCOLOGY 693, 696 (2000); Jay S. Petrick et al., Monomethylarsonous Acid (MMAiii) is More
Toxic than Arsenite in Chang Liver Human Hepatocytes, 163 TOXICOLOGY & APPLIED PHARMACOL-
OGY 203 (2000).
156. BURNETr & HAHN, supra note 149, at 7.
157. Id. at 6.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 8.
160. Id. at 14.
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Burnett and Hahn go further still. They urge that the arsenic regulation is
likely to produce a net loss in life rather than a gain. The reason is that
expensive regulations have been found to have mortality effects, in part because
they make less money available for health care expenditures.' 6 1 According to
one estimate, a statistical life is lost for every $15 million expenditure, so that a
regulation that costs $15 million per life saved results in no net mortality
reduction. 162 If this is correct, a regulation that costs $190 million on net is
likely to result in a loss of over ten lives, on balance, every year. This in fact is
the Burnett-Hahn conclusion.1
6 3
It is not clear if the Burnett-Hahn analysis influenced the actions of the Bush
Administration, but the arsenic rule was delayed shortly after the election' 64 and
the EPA asked the National Academy of Sciences to produce an "expedited
review" of the options between 3 ppb and 20 ppb. At the same time, the Agency
sought new studies on both the cost and benefit sides. 1
6 5
IV. QUESTIONS AND DOUBTS
Many questions should be raised about the analysis by both the EPA and
Burnett and Hahn. The first set of questions involves the judgment about the
likely benefits in terms of mortality and morbidity. The second set involves the
translation of those benefits into dollar equivalents.
My goal here is not to take sides on the disagreement between the EPA and
Burnett and Hahn. Instead, it is to suggest that the state of scientific know-
ledge at the time justified only benefit ranges, not specific benefit numbers. This
point easily might be taken as a challenge to CBA in general, and it is properly
so taken if CBA is justified as a way of giving specific bottom lines to resolve
hard cases. But if CBA is justified more modestly, as a way of getting a sense of
the potential consequences of various courses of action, nothing I say here
should be seen as a challenge to the basic method. Indeed, a virtue of CBA is
that it helps to explain why the arsenic question is hard and why competing
judgments of value could lead in competing directions. I will say more about all
this below.
161. Id. at 2.
162. See Randall Lutter et al., The Cost-Per-Life-Saved Cutoff for Safety-Enhancing Regulations, 37
ECON. INQUIRY 599, 605 (1999).
163. BURNEIr & HAHN, supra note 149, at 7.
164. National Primary Drinking Water Regulations, 66 Fed. Reg. 16,134, 16,134 (Mar. 23, 2001)
(codified at 40 C.FR. pts. 9, 141, 142).
165. National Primary Drinking Water Regulations, 66 Fed. Reg. 20,579 (Apr. 23, 2001) (codified at
40 C.ER. pts. 9, 141, 142); Press Release, EPA, EPA Administrator Whitman Establishes Process to
Evaluate Arsenic in Drinking Water Standard (Apr. 18, 2001), available at http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/
admpress.nsf.
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A. LIFE AND HEALTH AGAIN
1. The Dose-Response Curve in General
In calculating health effects, the EPA assumed a linear dose-response curve
for arsenic. 166 In so doing, it followed its usual practice, which is to assume a
linear, no-threshold model for Class A carcinogens in drinking water. In the
EPA's words, this is a "conservative mathematical model for cancer risk assess-
ment" that "is consistent with a no-threshold model of carcinogenesis, i.e.,
exposure to even a very small amount of the substance is assumed to produce a
finite increased risk of cancer."1 67 Note that the EPA's Science Advisory Board,
which consisted of prominent scientists who issued a report advising the
Agency, also recommended linear extrapolation based upon the Taiwan data. 168
But Burnett and Hahn are correct to urge that this was not an inevitable
decision. It is quite possible that the effects of arsenic dwindle at low levels.
"There is no strict rule with respect to the shape of the dose-response curve." 169
To summarize what will be a lengthy and somewhat technical discussion: On
the basis of what is known about carcinogens generally, the best scientific
judgment seems to be that the dose-response curve for arsenic is sublinear. But
this is a speculative judgment, not based on direct evidence. In addition, we
certainly do not know how sublinear the dose-response curve is, if indeed it is
sublinear.
There are many complexities here, for dose-response curves come in many
shapes and sizes:
It has long been recognized that a number of different mathematical models
can fit a given set of dose-response data reasonably well, but produce vastly
different predictions of risk when extrapolated to doses below the data range.
Thus, extrapolated doses corresponding to 'de minimis' risk levels can differ
by several orders of magnitude, depending on the shape of the dose-response
curve at low doses.1
70
Often there is no evidence about the relationship between adverse effects and
low doses; hence, a great deal of guesswork is involved. An overview suggests
that:
a number of models have been proposed, and there is active debate on which
of these is most appropriate. One that is widely used by regulatory agencies
166. National Primary Drinking Water Regulations, 66 Fed. Reg. 6976, 6994 (Jan. 22, 2001)
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 141, 142).
167. 40 C.F.R. pt. 132, app. C (2001).
168. See 66 Fed. Reg. at 7003, 7005.
169. TOXICOLOGY, supra note 2, at 1164.
170. Ralph L. Kodell, U-Shaped Dose-Response Relationships for Mutation and Cancer, 7 HUMAN
AND ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 4, 4 (2001).
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because it is 'conservative' is a linear no-threshold extrapolation. As noted,
proof has not been provided for any carcinogen that no threshold exists, and
in fact, thresholds have been observed in many studies, particularly with weak
carcinogens. The assumption of linearity at low doses is also not well
founded. Indeed, even for the less complicated process of chemical mutagen-
esis in vivo, a drop below linearity at low doses has been demonstrated.
Therefore, a 'hockey stick'-shaped curve would appear to best fit current data
and concepts on carcinogenic mechanisms at low levels of exposure. 17
There are five basic possibilities. 172
a. Supralinearity. For some forms of radiation, the curve is actually "supralin-
ear" in the sense that with lower doses, deaths fall at relatively lower rates than
a linear curve would predict.' 73 If a dose-response curve is supralinear, of
course, the death rate will be higher than if it is linear. Agencies do not assume
supralinearity, apparently because it is an unusual pattern. No one has urged
supralinearity in the context of arsenic.
b. Linearity. It has long been assumed that linear curves are appropriate for
"genotoxic" carcinogens; that is, carcinogens that work directly on DNA to
produce mutations that give rise to tumors. 174 For a long time arsenic has been
assumed not to be genotoxic-a point that draws the EPA's assumption of
linearity into some doubt because sublinearity is the ordinary assumption for
nongenotoxic carcinogens. But a recent paper suggests that arsenic may be
genotoxic after all. 1
75
c. Sublinearity. According to a standard text, the typical dose-response curve
is "sigmoidal" in shape and thus sublinear at low doses. 17 6 While there is some
dispute about the issue, evidence suggests that this is the shape of the dose-
response curve for benzene. 177 As noted, scientists generally assume sublinear-
171. CASARET" AND DOULL'S TOXICOLOGY: THE BASIC SCIENCE OF POISONS 154 (Mary 0. Amdur et al.
eds., 4th ed. 1991); see also D.B. Farrar & K.S. Crump, Exact Statistical Tests for any Carcinogenic
Effect in Animal Bioassays, 15 FUNDAMENTAL APPLIED TOXICOLOGY 710 (1990); D.G. Hoel et al., The
Impact of Toxicity on Carcinogenicity Studies: Implications for Risk Assessment, 9 CARCINOGENESIS
2045 (1988); E.M. Laska & M.J. Meisner, Statistical Methods and Applications of Bioassay, 27
ANNUAL REV. PHARMACOLOGY & TOXICOLOGY 385 (1987).
172. See Appendix for more detail.
173. JOHN W. GOFMAN, RADIATION-INDUCED CANCER FROM Low-DOsE EXPOSURE: AN INDEPENDENT
ANALYSIS ch. 14 (1990).
174. See Kodell, supra note 170, at 4.
175. Marc J. Mass et al., Methylated Trivalent Arsenic Species Are Genotoxic, 14 CHEMICAL RES.
TOXICOLOGY 355, 355 (2001).
176. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF TOXICOLOGY 509 (Philip Wexler ed., 1998).
177. See 0. Wong & G.K. Raabe, Cell-Type-Specific Leukemia Analyses in a Combined Cohort of
More Than 208,000 Petroleum Workers in the United States and United Kingdom, 1937-1989, 21 REG.
TOXICOLOGY & PHARMACOLOGY. 307, 315 (1995).
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ity for substances that are nongenotoxic-that is, that do not work directly on
DNA. 178
d. Thresholds. Sometimes there is a threshold below which exposure pro-
duces no adverse effects, as is apparently the case for basal cell carcinoma-
exposure to the sun179-and also for chloroform.' 80 This is the extreme case of
sublinearity. It is generally agreed that thresholds exist "for all toxicities other
than cancer. ... Conceptually, a threshold makes sense for most toxic ef-
fects."' 8"' Government agencies tend to treat carcinogens as lacking safe thresh-
olds. Taken purely as a scientific judgment, this is disputed: "It is a fact that
most of the identified human carcinogens induce cancer only after exposure to
high doses."''
82
e. U-shapes. Some dose-response curves-like the curve for fluoride-
actually show desirable effects at low levels, so that what is harmful to health at
high doses turns out to produce beneficial effects at low doses. 183 This is true of
course for many medicines, like aspirin, antibiotics, and antihistamines. There
appears to be increasing reason to believe that u-shapes are common. "In recent
years, the concept of hormesis, the phenomenon whereby a toxic substance
elicits a beneficial effect at doses below its observed range of toxicity, has been
gaining popularity among scientists engaged in toxicology and risk assess-
ment." 1
8 4
178. I.EH. Purchase & T.R. Auton, Thresholds in Chemical Carcinogenesis, 22 REG. TOXICOLOGY &
PHARMACOLOGY 199, 204 (1995).
179. See Anne Kricker et al., A Dose-Response Curve for Sun Exposure and Basal Cell Carcinoma,
60 INT'L J. CANCER 482 (1995).
180. See Chlorine Chemistry Council v. EPA, 206 E3d 1286 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
181. PRINCIPLES OF TOXICOLOGY 449 (Phillip L. Williams et al. eds., 2000).
182. TOxICOLOGY, supra note 2, at 176.
183. Ralph Kodell & Qi Zheng, U-Shaped Dose-Response Curves for Carcinogenesis, abstract
available at U-Shaped Dose-Response Curves for Carcinogenesis (1999) (unpublished manuscript, on
file with the author).
184. See id. at 11-12. The author's conclusion is worth quoting:
For carcinogens that may exhibit U-shaped dose-response curves, traditional linear, low-dose
extrapolation truly is conservative in the sense of public-health protection. However, this
'default' procedure cannot be justified simply on the basis of either presumed genotoxicity or
additivity to background. If definitive data on low-dose behavior of specific carcinogens
should indicate U-shaped behavior, then relaxing the default procedure to accommodate
substantially lower-than-linear estimates of risk seems justified, without fear of seriously
underestimating risk (EPA 1996). However, it will require strong data, of a nature and quality
not customarily available, to warrant a regulatory agency's acceptance of a dose-response
relationship that predicts less-than-background risk at low doses. The modeling exercise
presented here provides additional support and encouragement for investigators to pursue the
gathering of biologically definitive data other than typical tumor incidence data when horme-
sis is strongly suggested or conjectured.
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2. The Dose-Response Curve in Particular
The possibility of varying shapes suggests many possible projections of the
health consequences of exposure to low doses of arsenic. Without having any
direct evidence for arsenic in particular, the NRC suggested: "Of the several
modes of action that are considered most plausible, a sub-linear dose response
curve in the low-dose range is predicted, though linearity cannot be ruled out."' 
85
This statement should be taken as exceptionally speculative. It ought not to
be read to suggest a reliable scientific judgment about the true dose-response
curve, for the NRC offered no evidence that would justify its "prediction" for
arsenic. It appears to have been generalizing from the more typical patterns. If a
specific judgment is required, this approach is as sensible as any other, but it is
not much more than a hunch. Nonetheless, we can reach some more definite
conclusions. First: When agencies generally assume linearity, it is not because
anything in the science solidly justifies this assumption, but because of a
"conservative" approach to uncertain data.186 This is a policy choice, not a
technical one-a point with implications for judicial review, as we shall see.
Second: Rather than setting forth a specific number, it seems best to acknowl-
edge the uncertainty about the dose-response curve and hence to identify a
range of benefits-capturing a low end and a high end.
The upshot? For arsenic in particular, the high end emerges from a linear
curve and therefore would be twenty-eight lives saved annually. The low end is
six lives saved annually, which is what emerges from dividing that number by
five. That division is essentially arbitrary, so we should not credit the Burnett-
Hahn suggestion that it is likely to be accurate.
3. Nonquantified Benefits
What about the nonquantified benefits? Here it would be certainly responsible
to say, as did the EPA, that the data do not allow numerical judgments of any
kind. But it would also be responsible to attempt to specify an upper and lower
bound. Burnett and Hahn estimate the "nonquantified" benefits by multiplying
the EPA's expected lives saved by two. 187 But this seems arbitrary. As they note,
the National Research Council estimated the risk of all types of cancer as eight
times greater than the risk from bladder cancer alone. Because the EPA's figure
of twenty-eight lives saved came from both bladder and lung cancer, it would
have been sensible to posit an upper bound of 112 (arrived at by multiplying
twenty-eight by four). The multiplier of four is reasonable because the NRC
suggested a risk eight times as high as the risk from bladder cancer, which is to
185. See, SUBCOMM. ON ARSENIC IN DRINKING WATER, NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 4, at 7.
186. But see Adam M. Finkel, A Second Opinion on an Environmental Misdiagnosis: The Risky
Prescriptions of Breaking the Vicious Circle, 3 N.Y.U. ENvT. L.J. 295, 341-45 (1995) (providing some
evidence that linearity is a scientifically plausible assumption).
187. BURNETr & HAHN, supra note 149, at 7.
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say approximately four times the risk from bladder cancer and lung cancer. If
the lower bound of lives saved (from the analysis of possible sublinearity) is
six, the lower bound, from that assumption, would be twenty-four.
4. Problems in Taiwan
I have suggested that there are many reasons to question the Taiwan data,
which involved a poorer population with a worse diet, at risk of arsenic
exposure from multiple sources other than drinking water. Another criticism
of the Taiwan data is that it measures arsenic exposure by overall exposure
to village wells and not individual exposure.' 88 There is an additional
problem. Wells within each village had varying arsenic levels (so that people
using certain wells had much higher exposures than others in the same
village), but not all village wells were measured, and villagers were as-
signed a single median concentration (the data also did not account for
villagers who moved because it assumed a lifetime exposure to the levels of
a subject's present village).' 89 Thus the principal data on which the EPA
relied did not allow precise extrapolations. The NRC explicitly acknowl-
edged this point: "Some factors, such as poor nutrition and arsenic intake
from food, might affect assessment of risk in Taiwan or extrapolation of
results in the United States."' 90
On the basis of the EPA's data and with reasonable assumptions,' 9 ' the best
conclusion is that the number of lives saved by the regulation would range
between 6 and 112. To say the least, that is an exceedingly wide range. If the
regulation were expected to cost $6 million, it would seem reasonable to
proceed; almost no one denies that a cost per life saved of $1 million is
worthwhile. If the regulation were expected to cost $10 billion, it would seem
reasonable not to proceed. But what if the cost fell between $6 million and $10
billion? What if the cost were about $200 million, as the EPA estimated? To
make progress on that question, it is necessary to discuss the question of
monetization.
B. MONETIZING
With respect to money, the principal disagreement between the EPA and
Burnett and Hahn involves the appropriate discount rate. For the moment, let us
put that issue to one side; I will return to it shortly. As the EPA acknowledges in
its "sensitivity analysis," there are good reasons to adjust the EPA's monetized
estimate upwards rather than downwards.
188. See National Primary Drinking Water Regulations, 66 Fed. Reg. 6976, 7003 (Jan. 22, 2001)
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 141, 142).
189. Id. at 7003-04.
190. SUBCOMM. ON ARSENIC IN DRINKING WATER, supra note 4, at 301.
191. See supra Section IV.A.2.
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1. Arsenic Versus the Workplace
As I have noted, the EPA's $6.1 million figure comes from workplace risks
not involving cancer and generally involving dangers to which workers expose
themselves voluntarily-in the sense that they receive compensation in return.
In fact many questions might be raised about the workplace risk studies. 192 One
problem is the sheer variety of the number in those studies, ranging from $0.7
million to $16.3 million in 1997 dollars. Consider the following table:
Table 5
Value of Life Studies
193
Value of
Statistical Life
(VSL) in 1997
Study Method Dollars
Kneisner and Leith (1991) Labor market 0.7 million
Smith and Gilbert (1984) Labor market 0.8 million
Dillingham (1985) Labor market 1.1 million
Marin and Psacharopoulos (1982) Labor market 3.4 million
V.K. Smith (1976) Labor market 5.7 million
Viscusi (1981) Labor market 7.9 million
Leigh and Folsom (1984) Labor market 11.7 million
Leigh (1987) Labor market 12.6 million
Garen (1988) Labor market 16.3 million
This wide range of the outcomes raises questions about the reliability of the
$6.1 million figure. The EPA updated the relevant numbers for inflation, but it
did not otherwise make adjustments. On reasonable assumptions, the EPA
appears to have produced a significant undervaluation of the monetary value of
the lives at stake. Consider the following points.
a. Income Growth. The EPA acknowledged that the $6.1 million figure re-
flects no adjustment to account for changes in national real income growth. In
principle, the failure to undertake an adjustment seems to be a serious mistake.
192. For several such questions, see Robert H. Frank & Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Analysis and
Relative Position, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 323 (2001). For a reply, see GREGORY BESHAROV, AEI-BROOKINGS
JoINT CENTER FOR REGULATORY STUDIES, THREE QUESTIONS ABOUT THE ECONOMICS OF RELATIVE POSITION:
A RESPONSE TO FRANK AND SUNSTEIN, available at http://www.aei.brookings.org/publications/working/
working_01_08.pdf.
193. See U.S. EPA, Guidelines for Preparing Economic Analyses 89 (2000), available at http://
yosemite 1 .epa.gov/ee/epa/eed.nsf/pages/guidelines.
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Of course people with more money would be willing to pay more, other things being
equal, to reduce statistical risks. As the EPA also noted in its sensitivity analysis, the
appropriate adjustment would increase the VSL from $6.1 million to $6.7 million. 94
b. Distinctive Risks. The risk of cancer from drinking water is qualitatively
different from the workplace risks that the EPA used to generate its VSL. The
risks from drinking water seem peculiarly involuntary and uncontrollable, and a
great deal of literature suggests that involuntary and uncontrollable risks pro-
duce greater individual concern. 195 It is important not to think that there is a
rigid dichotomy between the involuntary-uncontrollable and the voluntary-
controllable. 196 This is a continuum without sharp divisions among various
points. The underlying issues seem to be whether those exposed to the risk are
exposed knowingly and whether it is costly or otherwise difficult for people to
avoid the risk. As compared to workplace risks, there can be little doubt that the
risk of arsenic from drinking water is worse along the relevant dimensions. For
this reason, it makes sense to think that people would be willing to pay a
premium to avoid the risks associated with arsenic.
There are some related points. People seem to have a special fear of cancer,
and they seem to be willing to pay more to prevent a cancer death than either a
sudden unanticipated death or a death from heart disease. 197 The cancer "pre-
mium" might be produced by the dreaded nature of cancer; it seems well-
established that some risks are particularly dreaded and that dreaded risks
produce special social concern, holding the statistical risk constant. Some
studies suggest that people are willing to pay twice as much to prevent a cancer
death as an instantaneous death.
198
The EPA was alert to these points. Its own sensitivity analysis suggests the
need for an upwards revision of seven percent because of the involuntariness
and uncontrollability of the risk.' 99 With this revision and the revision for
income growth, the value of a statistical life would rise to about $7.2 million.2 ° °
In fact there are reasons to believe that this might be far too low. One study
suggests that "the value of avoiding a death from an involuntary, carcinogenic
risk should be estimated as four times as large as the value of avoiding an
instantaneous workplace fatality."'20 1 If we take this approach, the value jumps
from $6.7 million to $26.8 million.
194. National Primary Drinking Water Regulations, 66 Fed. Reg. 6976, 7012 (Jan. 22, 2001)
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 141, 142).
195. See SLOVIC, supra note 14, at 101-02.
196. See Cass R. Sunstein, Bad Deaths, 14 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 259, 260 (1997).
197. See George Tolley et al., State of the Art Health Values, in VALUING HEALTH FOR POLICY: AN
ECONOMIC APPROACH 339-40 (George Tolley et al. eds., 1993).
198. See id.
199. See 66 Fed. Reg. at 7014.
200. See id.
201. Revesz, supra note 12, at 982.
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c. One More Wealth Effect. There is a final point. The studies that produced
the $6.1 million figure involved the workplace, and the people involved were
poorer than most workers. Because the median salary of all wage earners is
twenty-three percent higher than the median salary of most workers involved in
the willingness-to-pay studies, a further adjustment seems appropriate, produc-
ing a VSL of $33 million.
Now it would be foolish to claim that this figure has a unique claim to
accuracy. But with different assumptions, none of them entirely implausible,
the value of a statistical life at risk from arsenic can range from $1.1 million
to $33 million-and the number of lives saved from 6 to 112. In terms of
dollars, that produces a lower bound of $6.6 million, and an upper bound of
$3.7 billion!
d. Life-Years as Opposed to Lives. Would the arsenic rule protect young
people or old people? The question seems to matter because, in principle, it is
better for the government to devote resources toward saving many years rather
than simply a few. 20 2 If the government can prevent a death at seventy-five that
would otherwise occur at eighty, surely it should attempt to do so; but if
resources are limited, the government would do better to prevent a death at
twenty that would otherwise occur at eighty. The point seems to matter here
because it appears that the arsenic rule would protect mostly older people, not
younger ones. If this is right, it is because of the long latency period. Because
arsenic-induced cancer does not occur until decades after exposure, the average
age of the victims of arsenic-induced cancer would be relatively high, possibly
above retirement age.203 Nonetheless, the EPA treated each life involved as
worth $6.1 million. This number might well be inflated.
e. Nonfatal Cancers. As we have seen, the EPA valued a nonfatal cancer at
$607,000 based on shopping mall studies involving answers to hypothetical
questions with respect to chronic bronchitis. There are obviously many prob-
lems with this approach; chronic bronchitis simply is not nonfatal cancer. In fact
another study (also with serious methodological problems) produced a $3.6
million figure for nonfatal cancers. 204 This amount seems quite odd because it
suggests that preventing a nonfatal cancer is valued at well over fifty percent of
the value of preventing a fatal cancer ($6.1 million using the EPA's estimate).
But suppose that this number is taken to be accurate or a reasonable upper
bound. If so, the monetized value of reductions in nonfatal cancers from the 10
202. See Richard Zeckhauser & Donald Shepard, Where Now for Saving Lives, 40 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 5, 11-15 (1976).
203. See AM. Soc'Y OF CIVIL ENG'RS, ARSENIC IN DRINKING WATER: AN ANALYSIS OF THE ENVIRONMEN-
TAL PROTECTION AGENCY'S NATIONAL PRIMARY DRINKING WATER REGULATION FOR ARSENIC 66 FED. REG.
6976 (JAN. 22, 2001), at 12 (2001), available at http://www.asce.org/pdf/arsenic.pdf.
204. See ARSENIC RULE BENEFITS REVIEW PANEL, supra note 144, at 17.
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ppb standard rises in value to about $93.6 million-a sizeable jump over the
$15 million produced by the $607,000 figure.
2. Discounting
It does seem sensible to say that a discount rate should be applied to latent
harms. A cancer thirty years from now is not as bad as a cancer tomorrow. Note
that this point does not take a stand on the controversial question of whether
harms to future generations should be discounted. 0 5 The only suggestion is that
people today would be willing to pay less to prevent a cancer in decades than a
cancer in weeks. Now it would be possible to suggest that arsenic regulation is
designed to prevent risks, not actual harms, and that the risks, unlike the harms,
will occur immediately. The suggestion is correct, but it is not responsive.
People would pay more to prevent a risk of harm in a month than a risk of a
harm in two decades, and that claim is sufficient to justify discounting here.
But to make an assessment, it is not enough to decide to discount. We also
have to decide (a) the appropriate discount rate and (b) the latency period.
Burnett and Hahn choose a seven percent figure, which comes from the discount
rate for money.20 6 But it is not obvious that the same discount rate is sensible
for latent harms as for money, and there is some reason to think the opposite. If
the seven percent figure is correct for money, there are two reasons. First,
money can be invested and will grow, and because of that simple fact a dollar
today is worth more than a dollar in a year. Second, people have a "pure" time
preference for current income. Even apart from investment value, it would be
better to have money soon. If willingness to pay is to govern the discount rate,
then the calculation of that rate for money should be a function of these two
points. To be sure, government selection of the discount rate is usually a
simplified version of this analysis and depends on the investment value of money.
Note, however, that the analysis is not the same for risks of harm. It is not
possible to "invest" good health, at least not in the same way as dollars. If one is
going to get cancer in any event, a cancer-free year cannot be used to produce
more of the same. To be sure, most people would rather get cancer thirty years
hence than ten years hence-perhaps to ensure more life-years or perhaps
because of a pure time preference. And indeed, it would be desirable to shift the
analysis from lives to life-years. But there is no reason to think that the time
preference for health is identical to the time preference for money. There are
many uncertainties here. Some evidence supports a discount rate of two to three
percent,2° 7 which would result, not in a figure of $1.1 million per life saved, but
a figure closer to $4.5 million. My principal points are that no evidence shows
205. See Revesz, supra note 12, at 987-1016, for a helpful treatment that separates the two
questions.
206. See BURNE-r" & HAHN, supra note 149, at 6.
207. See Revesz, supra note 12, at 992.
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that future health benefits should be discounted at the same rate as future
monetary costs-and, more speculatively, that there is good reason to think that
the discount rate for health benefits should be lower than the discount rate for
monetary costs.
What of the latency period? Hahn and Burnett chose thirty years, but this
time period seems both long and somewhat arbitrary. If the latency period is
chosen to be twenty years rather than thirty, the value per life saved increases
still further, approaching $5 million.
Here is my own summary of possible cost-benefit assessments:
Table 6
Cost-Benefit Ranges
Lives VSL Benefits Costs Net Benefits
EPA 28 (plus $6.1 million $170 million (plus $210 million -$40 million (plus
unquantified) unquantified) unquantified)
AEI-Brookings 11 $1.1 million $23 million $210 million -$187 million
"Best Estimate"
My (Very) High 112 $33 million $3.794 billion208 $210 million $3.584 billion
Estimate
My High Estimate 112 $6.7 million $789 million'09  $210 million $579 million
My Best "Point None; too $4.5 million No estimatezl °  $210 million No estimate
Estimate" speculative
My Low Estimate 6 $1.1 million $13 million $210 million -$197 million
(based on
fundamental
acceptance of EPA
conclusions)
My (Very) Low Estimate 0 $1.1 million $0 $210 million -$210 million
(based on extemal
criticisms of EPA
conclusions)
One final point on this table. It might be suggested that some effort should be
made to identify a "best estimate" and that analysis would be greatly improved
by trying to assign probabilities to the various outcomes, with the "best esti-
208. This number was calculated by multiplying 112 by $33 million, obtaining $3.7 billion, and then
adding $3.6 million (the highest reasonable upper bound for nonfatal cancers) multiplied by 26,
producing $93.6 million, for the total of $3.794 billion.
209. This number was calculated by multiplying 112 by $6.7 million, obtaining $750 million, and
then adding $1.5 million (a more reasonable upper bound for nonfatal cancers) multiplied by 26,
producing $39 million, for the total of $789 million.
210. This figure cannot be calculated because there is no estimate of lives saved. To calculate this
figure, one would multiply lives saved by about $4.5 million (to accommodate both cancer premium
and latency period), multiply nonfatal cancers prevented by about $1.5 million or more, and add those
two figures together.
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mate" consisting of the most probable one. The goal of this suggestion is
correct. When the underlying science and economics allow analysts to come up
with a "best estimate" and to assign probabilities to the alternative outcomes,
this indeed should be done. In terms of monetizing the relevant values, it seems
correct to say that the cancer risk deserves a premium as compared to workplace
risks, but also to insist on discounting the monetary value of the risk to take
account of the latency period and the fewer life-years saved. Hence, rough
estimates of $4.5 million per life saved and $1.5 million per nonfatal cancer
prevented seem as reasonable as anything else, even if somewhat arbitrary. At
the very least, the EPA's $6.1 million figure appears too high in light of the long
latency period, and the AEI-Brookings $1.1 million figure appears too low in
light of the high discount rate that it reflects and the various factors suggesting
that the workplace studies understate the monetary value of the risk involved
here.
But with respect to health benefits, science does not allow best estimates to
be provided here. It would be reasonable to suggest that the high estimate of
112 lives saved is unrealistically high and a bit of a scare tactic in light of the
problems in the Taiwan data and the probability that the dose-response curve is
sublinear. The estimate of zero lives saved is highly improbable. But it does
seem to me sensible to move toward concern with life-years saved rather than
lives saved, and because of the long latency period, the quantified benefits are
most unlikely to be enormously higher than the $210 million price tag.2 ' On
the other hand, they might well be higher whether or not they are much higher,
and for reasons to be elaborated shortly, the "bottom line" numbers need not be
dispositive.
C. LESSONS
Does all this suggest that CBA is, in cases of this sort, unhelpful? It would
not be hard to imagine an affirmative answer to that question. A skeptic might
conclude that because the range of uncertainty is so large, any number at all
could be justified and the ultimate decision is essentially political or based on
"values." This view is not exactly wrong, but it should not be taken as a
convincing challenge to CBA.
An analysis of benefits and costs cannot resolve the ultimate judgment, but it
can certainly inform it. Once we understand the potential effects of different
arsenic regulations and see where the uncertainties come from, we are in a
much better position to know what to do. Of course a decision on that count will
be a product of "values"-how could it be otherwise? The point is that the
values should be identified as such, so that when the government acts, its
211. This judgment is based on the information before the EPA when it initially decided to issue the
new regulation. New data suggest that the monetized benefits may indeed be much higher than the
monetized costs. See SUBCOMM. ON ARSENIC IN DRINKING WATER, supra note 13, at 4.
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reasons are transparent and explicable. If what I have said thus far is correct, the
choice of a new arsenic rule was a genuinely hard question on the data before
the EPA in 2000. Under the best case scenario, the benefits will exceed the
costs, though perhaps not by a great deal. Under the worst case scenario, the
costs will exceed the benefits. It is a tribute to CBA that we know exactly why
the ultimate judgment is hard.
V. CBA IN COURT
We are now in a position to see the multiple possible challenges to any
agency decision, that involves cost-benefit balancing. Because such balancing
has become a staple of regulatory practice, it is important for lawyers to have
some understanding of the underlying ideas and of how agencies might be said
to have gone wrong. There are lessons for courts as well, mostly involving the
need for deference to agencies.
A. LAWYERS: HOW TO MAKE BENEFITS GO WAY UP OR WAY DOWN
With respect to the regulation of social risks, the legal culture is increasingly
required to pay close attention to both science and economics, 21 2 and here legal
understandings remain in a primitive state. If we keep in mind the arithmetic of
arsenic, we can see how creative lawyers representing water systems or environ-
mentalists might be able to mount plausible challenges to the EPA's decisions
regardless (almost) of the content of those decisions. I do not mean to endorse
these challenges, but simply to give a sense of what they might look like. The
following list catalogues the potential challenges.
1. The Dose Response Curve
A great deal depends on the dose-response curve, and at low levels the
scientific evidence will often be inconclusive. With the assumption of a linear
curve, the benefits of regulation will seem far higher than they might otherwise
be. But from the scientific point of view, that assumption might be vulnerable.
In the case of arsenic, the most striking point is that the independent entities on
which the EPA relies actually split on the issue, with the Scientific Advisory
Board supporting linearity and the National Research Council tentatively favor-
ing sublinearity. In addition, linearity makes more sense for genotoxic carcino-
gens, and there is a dispute about whether arsenic is genotoxic. A decision to
assume linearity, in the face of scientific uncertainty, is best seen as a (reason-
able) policy judgment. Under a statute that calls for a "margin of safety," such a
judgment is plainly supportable. It may be that an agency can indulge such a
212. See, e.g., Am. Trucking Ass'ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (discussing the scientific
and economic issues involved in regulating particulates and ozone), rev'd, Whitman v. Am. Trucking
Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001); Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991)
(discussing the economic costs and scientific evidence relating to asbestos regulation).
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judgment under a statute that calls for cost-benefit balancing, but certainly not if
science clearly points in the other direction. 2 13 For a lawyer objecting to
regulation that seems too stringent, the best claim is that sublinearity is more
likely. 214 For a lawyer objecting to regulation that seems inadequate, the best
claim is that in the absence of specific data, linearity is the standard default
assumption on policy grounds. As a legal matter, the EPA is probably on solid
ground in relying on the linearity assumptions if the scientific evidence is
unclear.
2. Inadequate Evidence
When regulating a pollutant, the EPA will often have to rely on evidence
from other times and areas, and it will be easy to suggest that there are relevant
differences between the population at issue and the population from which that
evidence derives. In the case of arsenic, the Taiwan data could certainly be
challenged as inadequate in light of the absence of data from the United States
confirming the basic results.
3. Valuation Problems
If cancer risks are involved, the agency's decision to use its ordinary VSL can
be challenged on the ground that good evidence shows a higher VSL for risks
that are dreaded and uncontrollable (as cancer risks are likely to be). Lawyers
objecting to insufficiently aggressive regulation could use this evidence to
suggest that the VSL numbers from workplace studies are simply too low.
Lawyers objecting to overaggressive regulation could insist that the only reli-
able data come from the workplace studies and that any efforts to produce
higher numbers are too speculative.21 5
4. Poor Morbidity Data
Agencies frequently lack good data on morbidity risks and therefore use
crude substitutes. These are easily subject to challenge. In the arsenic case, an
environmental lawyer could urge that the chronic bronchitis numbers are far too
low because a case of cancer is very likely to produce higher willingness to pay
than a case of chronic bronchitis.216 For their part, industry lawyers could urge
that chronic bronchitis is comparable or perhaps even worse, simply because it
is chronic. Perhaps a case of cured cancer, even if it is entirely cured, is not
much more serious than a case of any other curable disease, and perhaps a
213. For a holding to this effect, see Chlorine Chemistry Council v. EPA 206 F.3d 1286, 1291 (D.C.
Cir. 2000) (ruling that EPA acted arbitrarily and capriciously in overriding scientific evidence that
chloroform is a threshold pollutant under the SDWA).
214. See id. at 1287-89.
215. See ScI. ADVISORY BD., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, VALUING THE BENEFITS OF FATAL CANCER RISK
REDUCTION (1999).
216. See SUICOMM. ON ARSENIC IN DRINKING WATER, supra note 13, at 33-34.
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serious chronic condition such as chronic bronchitis is more serious than a
cured cancer. In either case, it would be easy to challenge the actual numbers
used for chronic bronchitis as unreliable, because they were generated through
responses by shoppers in North Carolina to hypothetical questions. Even if
well-designed, that study is not likely to produce reliable numbers.
5. Lives vs. Life-Years
If an agency uses lives rather than life-years, there may be a serious problem,
at least if the regulation would protect a large number of children or elderly
people. For protection of children, the $6.1 million figure is arguably far too
low; for protection of elderly people, that same figure is arguably far too
high.217
6. Inadequate Quantification of Benefits
For a lawyer on either side, it is not hard to argue that unquantified benefits
should be quantified, if this is at all possible.218 Without quantification, how can
agency decisions be evaluated? And once a decision is made to quantify benefits
that had formerly been unquantified, agency judgments are subject to challenge
because the judgment about how to quantify will be highly speculative. If the
agency has not specified a range but has relied on a fairly specific projection, it
will be extremely vulnerable.
7. Choice of Discount Rate
The level of monetized benefits will differ dramatically with the chosen
discount rate. It would be easy to challenge any agency's decision not to
discount a risk that will come to fruition in the future. A monetary loss or a loss
to health is worse today than years hence. Once the agency has chosen to
discount, any particular discount rate might well be challenged. Economists
disagree about the proper approach. If the agency chooses a discount rate for
health in the vicinity of the discount rate for money-that is, seven to ten
percent-its choice might well be challenged on the ground that no good
evidence supports the view that health problems averted should be discounted at
the same rate as financial losses averted. But if the agency chooses a discount
rate below seven percent, it would not be hard to challenge that choice as
essentially arbitrary and unsupported by evidence.
B. AGAINST SCIENCE COURTS
Notwithstanding the availability of countless legal challenges, the basic
lesson for courts is simple: Hands off. When courts are reviewing an agency's
217. It is not clear, however, how to think about willingness to pay in this context. Older people tend
to be wealthier, and they might well be willing to pay large amounts to protect relatively few life years.
218. See ARSENIC RULE BENEFITS REVIEW PANEL, supra note 144, at 19.
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judgments about health benefits and how to monetize them, they should give
agencies the benefit of every reasonable doubt.
The reasons are threefold. First, the issues are exceedingly complex, and
judges are not specialists in the area at hand. Like everyone else, they are prone
to error. There is no systematic reason to think that a firm judicial hand will
make things better rather than worse. Second, any judicial judgment will
perpetuate the status quo and make rulemaking more difficult. 2 '9 Because it is
extremely time consuming to make rules and because a clever advocate likely
will be able to produce a plausible challenge to whatever an agency does, an
aggressive judicial posture will essentially freeze whatever rule is currently in
place. In many domains, people have expressed concern with the "ossification"
of rulemaking. 220 When a statute calls for cost-benefit balancing, any nondefer-
ential judicial posture will magnify the risk of ossification. Third, many of the
underlying decisions involve values, not facts. We have seen that often the
choice between a linear and sublinear dose-response curve cannot be based on
direct evidence. Any choice has a large policymaking dimension. "[T]here is
wide recognition among experts-but not necessarily in the public opinion-
that current approaches to the regulation of most agents remain judgmental."22'
In this light, courts should be reluctant to displace the judgments of administra-
tors, who have advantages both as technocrats and public representatives.
This does not mean that agencies should be permitted to do whatever they
want. We can easily imagine genuinely arbitrary decisions.222 But so long as the
agency has not done something truly unreasonable, its efforts to quantify and
monetize health benefits should be held acceptable.
VI. POLICY ANALYSTS: WHAT SHOULD BE DONE?
A. NO OBVIOUSLY BEST CHOICE
1. Puzzles
On the analysis thus far, it should be clear that there was no obviously best
choice for the EPA. Of the options considered, the most dramatic would be the
two poles: to retain the existing 50 ppb standard or to select the 3 ppb
standard-which the EPA deemed feasible. Neither of these choices would have
been ludicrous, and neither should be seen as violative of the SDWA. Notwith-
standing the NRC report, it would not be entirely irrational to conclude that the
existing data-most of it from Taiwan-simply does not justify further restric-
219. See JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 224-26, 245-46
(1990).
220. See, e.g., Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process, 41
DuKE L.J. 1385 (1992).
221. ToXICOLOGY, supra note 2, at 1145.
222. See, e.g., Chlorine Chemistry Council v. EPA., 206 F.3d 1286 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding EPA
chloroform rule arbitrary and capricious).
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tions, especially in light of studies suggesting no adverse effects from low levels
of arsenic in drinking water. And notwithstanding the AEI-Brookings study, it
would not be impossible to produce numbers suggesting that the 3 ppb standard
might well be justified, at least if the nonquantified benefits are taken into
account and pegged at the higher points in the range.
2. Tiebreakers
Could it be possible to resolve the controversy through some general, back-
ground considerations? When individuals and governments are not sure what to
do, they often invoke "second-order" principles designed to simplify the inquiry
in the event of difficulty.223 There are several possibilities here.
One solution would be to invoke the "precautionary principle," which says
that reasonable doubts should be resolved in favor of protecting safety, health,
and the environment. 224 The precautionary principle has had a significant
influence on both national and international environmental policy.22 5 It also
seems to track private behavior. People purchase smoke alarms and insurance;
perhaps regulation of arsenic can be seen as analogous. In the face of scientific
uncertainty, why not make an expenditure that might well turn out to avert
serious harm?2 26 In a catchphrase: Better safe than sorry.
227
If this point is meant to suggest that significant investments are worthwhile to
prevent speculative harms, it is certainly correct. But everything depends on the
size of the investment and the speculative nature of the harm. Taken seriously,
one problem with the precautionary principle is that it would lead to huge
expenditures, exhausting the relevant budget before the menu of options could
be thoroughly consulted. Indeed, the precautionary principle would lead to
paralysis because there are risks on all sides of the equation.228 Recall that
many households would be required to spend more than $300 per year for
water; EPA Administrator Whitman has expressed a concern that the increased
expenditure will lead many people to use small, local wells, which have heavily
223. See Cass R. Sunstein & Edna Ullmann-Margalit, Second-Order Decisions, in BEHAVIORAL LAW
AND ECONOMICS 187, 192-203 (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000).
224. Ken Geiser, Establishing a General Duty of Precaution in Environmental Protection Policies in
the United States, in PROTECTING PUBLIC HEALTH & THE ENVIRONMENT: IMPLEMENTING THE PRECAUTIONARY
PRINCIPLE XXi, xxiii (Carolyn Raffensperger & Joel Tickner eds., 1999).
225. See Julian Morris, Defining the Precautionary Principle, in RETHINKING RISK AND THE PRECAUTION-
ARY PRINCIPLE 1, 3-7 (Julian Morris ed., 2000)
226. The point may be supported by the fact that people are generally averse to low-probability,
high-risk outcomes, and would be willing to pay relatively high amounts so as not to run the relevant
risks. See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, in
CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES 17, 22-25 (Daniel Kahneman ed., 2000).
227. For a critical discussion, see HOWARD MARGOLIS, DEALING WITH RISK: WHY THE PUBLIC AND THE
EXPERTS DISAGREE ON ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES, 75-92 (1996).
228. See Indur M. Goklany, Applying the Precautionary Principle in a Broader Context, in RETHINK-
ING RISK AND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE, supra note 225, at 190-220.
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polluted water.229 In these circumstances, the precautionary principle suggests
that new arsenic regulation is undesirable because it might sacrifice lives. Recall
too that expensive regulations can have adverse effects on life and health and
hence that the $210 million expenditure for arsenic regulation has, as a worst
case scenario, significant adverse health effects, with perhaps as many as thirty
to forty lives lost.230 If this is so, the precautionary principle seems to argue
against new regulation. It seems clear that precaution, by itself, can be taken to
argue for no regulation, much regulation, and every point in between. On
reflection, the idea is insufficiently helpful.2 3'
Perhaps a more refined argument is better. For most of the country, the
incremental cost of the arsenic regulation is low-less than $30 per year. If the
vast majority of people would receive additional protection at a cost that is high
in the aggregate ($210 million, for example) but extremely low for each
affected family, shouldn't government proceed with regulation, perhaps with
exemptions or subsidies for those who would have to pay more? The argument
is not implausible, but it proves too much. In many cases, it would be possible
to do some good by asking everyone to pay, say, $2 per year. Should the EPA
ask every American to pay $2 year, so as to create a $500 million fund to be
used to pay for additional reductions in sulfur dioxide emissions? Carbon
monoxide emissions? Benzene emissions? Clean-up of lead paint? Anti-tobacco
advertising? Childhood immunizations? Relief of poverty? Because the list of
possibilities is endless, it is unhelpful to treat small per-family costs as if they
were zero or its moral equivalent; we do better to ensure that those funds are
used for purposes that would do more good than harm or for the most possible
good. This does not mean that a regulation imposing small per-family costs
(say, $30 per family for 200 million people) should be treated as identical to a
regulation imposing the same aggregate but higher per-family costs (say, $300
per family for 20 million people). High per-family costs do raise particular
concerns. But a regulation that badly fails cost-benefit balancing should not be
accepted on the ground that each family or person will pay little. (Imagine a
program that would require every American to pay $1 per year for little or no
return.)
229. "But we have seen instances, particularly in the West and Midwest, where arsenic is naturally
occurring at up to 700 and more parts per billion, where the cost of remediation has forced water
companies to close, leaving people with no way to get their water, save dig wells. And then they are
getting water that's even worse than what they were getting through the water company." Evans, Novak,
Hunt & Shields (CNN television broadcast, Apr. 21, 2001) (interview by Robert Novak and Al Hunt
with Christine Todd Whitman, EPA Administrator).
230. See BURNETr & HAHN, supra note 149, at 8, 14 tbl.l. On the general phenomenon, see Cass R.
Sunstein, Health-Health Tradeoffs, in SUNSTEIN, supra note 71, at 298-317.
23 1. For an effort to understand the precautionary principle in a way that takes account of multiple
risks, see INDUR M. GOKLANY, THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL
RISK ASSESSMENT (2001).
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Yet another tiebreaker is possible. Perhaps the EPA should refrain from
further regulation on the theory that government should not act unless there is a
clear demonstration that it is desirable, all things considered. Perhaps we should
adopt a presumption against regulatory controls unless CBA shows that they are
justified or unless there are special reasons-perhaps distributional in character-
that support them. Perhaps the government should not require costly expendi-
tures here in view of the fact that the same expenditures might be used for other goals,
such as crime reduction and automobile safety, where they could do more good.232
The problem is that the same kind of argument could have been used against
a wide range of environmental regulations even though those regulations have,
on balance, been vindicated by history.2 33 In the context of air quality regula-
tion, a contemporaneous assessment of costs and benefits would in many cases
have given rise to the same kind of uncertainty found here. Note that this is not
to suggest that in such cases the costs would have been found to outweigh the
benefits. The problem is instead that the most that could have been done was to
identify a benefits range leaving a great deal of uncertainty about what to do. If
the past is any guide, it suggests that inaction in such circumstances would be a
foolish course.
3. Between the Poles?
While no particular approach would be obviously best or obviously unreason-
able, the more reasonable approaches would appear to be between the poles. On
the existing numbers, the 3 ppb standard is hard to justify. No data support the
view that there would be significant health gains from moving from a 10 ppb
ceiling to one of 3 ppb.23 4 In view of the significant expense of the restriction,
10 ppb seems better. At the same time, the data do suggest that the 50 ppb
standard is insufficiently protective. A new regulation might be seen as a kind of
insurance policy, one without an enormous price tag. A choice that falls between
the 50 and 3 ppb ceiling would seem to be best--especially if it would be
possible to relieve the high burdens imposed on some households. Certainly the
10 ppb approach is reasonable.
This last point raises a more general one, overlooked thus far: The EPA's
menu of alternatives has been relatively narrow and has lacked much creativity.
The EPA discussed four different permissible exposure levels without thinking
more imaginatively about how to minimize the costs of arsenic regulation. The
blame for this narrow focus lies not with the EPA, but with Congress. I now
discuss several other approaches, designed to show more flexibility toward
those burdened by drinking water regulation.
232. Cf BREYER, supra note 48, at 59-63 (arguing for better priority-setting).
233. Portnoy, supra note 46, at 101-05.
234. Again, 1 am speaking of the data before the EPA when it made its initial decision to issue the 10
ppb rule.
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B. ARSENIC TARGETING AND ARSENIC WAIVING
A possible approach would involve "targeting," that is imposing regulation on
water systems when the cost-benefit ratio is especially good. Recall that for much of
the country, the cost of compliance with the 10 ppb standard is quite low. On
plausible-which is not to say certainly correct-assumptions, the cost-benefit ratio
for those systems is adequate to justify the regulation-perhaps even adequate to
support a 5 ppb or 3 ppb standard. These points suggest a simple alternative: Impose a
targeted rule, with a sliding scale of regulations ensuring that the cost-benefit ratio
supports the outcome in each area. When, for example, the annual cost of regulation is
less than $50 per household, government might impose a 5 ppb standard; when the
annual cost is less than $150, it might impose a 10 ppb standard; when it is less than
$350, it might impose a 20 ppb standard.
An approach of this kind would undoubtedly be controversial. Critics would
ask: Why should people in some parts of the country be subject to more arsenic
in their drinking water than people in other areas? Why should some people
have very low levels of arsenic, and other people less low levels? These
questions might seem especially difficult to answer if, as seems likely, many of
those subject to the more lenient standard would be relatively poor. Why should
poor people, and especially poor children, face levels of arsenic found unaccept-
ably dangerous in other parts of the country? But these questions have much
more rhetorical force than they deserve. If acceptable levels of risk are a
function of both cost and benefit, it makes perfect sense to say that such levels
will vary depending on the costs and benefits of controls in different localities.
In some areas of the country, it will be worthwhile to "purchase" an additional
increment of safety; in other areas, it will not be.
This point seems sufficient to suggest that the EPA should have the authority
to impose national standards that are not uniform.2 35 But the SDWA forbids any
such nonuniform standards. In keeping with its cost-benefit focus, the statute
should be amended to allow the EPA greater flexibility.
If the EPA cannot adopt a targeted regulation, could it allow waivers for areas
in which the benefits do not justify the costs? Once the data are disaggregated, it
seems reasonable to consider the following option: Adopt the 10 ppb regulation
for most water systems, when the per-family cost of compliance is low, but
offer a variance for water systems when the per-family cost is high. This
approach would be quite close to one involving targeted regulation. The SDWA
does allow waivers, but only for short periods of time, and hence waivers
produce less satisfactory outcomes than does targeting.
C. ARSENIC MARKETS
In contemporary environmental law, some of the most dramatic develop-
ments have involved the rise of market instruments for pollution control. These
235. 1 am not discussing whether national controls can be justified in principle.
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instruments take many forms, but among the most popular are "cap and trade"
systems, in which the total level of emissions is capped at a certain level and
polluters are allowed to trade licenses as long as the cap is respected.236 A chief
advantage of cap-and-trade systems is that they ensure the lowest-cost means of
achieving regulatory goals. Those who can eliminate pollution cheaply will do
exactly that. Those for whom reductions are expensive will purchase additional
permits.
Why not create a system of tradeable emissions rights, involving the right to
subject people to arsenic? The idea may well seem macabre. But if so, the
reason is likely to be a belief that arsenic is a poison seriously dangerous at any
level. This is a form of intuitive toxicology. If we suppose that within the range
under discussion (say 3 ppb to 20 ppb) dangerously high exposure levels will
not occur, and we suppose that the issue is one of appropriate degrees of safety,
we could easily imagine a cap-and-trade system. For example, government
could create an overall cap on arsenic and give licenses to subject people to 15
ppb, but also allow trading. As a result, companies that can reduce at low cost
will do so, whereas those that can do so at only high cost will stay at 15 ppb or
perhaps buy licenses to subject people to higher levels. Because of the familiar
"hot spots" problem, government would, under this regime, take steps to ensure
that no one is subjected to unacceptably high levels-say, 25 ppb or higher.
As compared with a system of national command-and-control, it is likely that
a system of this kind would produce much lower costs. Indeed, a system of
tradeable rights would likely spur considerable innovation in arsenic control
technology, which would be a significant gain. To evaluate it, we would want to
know the aggregate cost of the system and also compare the likely benefits to
those that would be enjoyed under the alternatives. It is not unimaginable that a
properly designed cap-and-trade system would produce both lower costs and
higher benefits than the command-and-control alternative. Note in this regard
that the Clinton Administration proposed a 10 ppb ceiling to be applied nation-
ally, but that a cap-and-trade system could ensure that people would have levels
well below 10 ppb in much of the country.
As compared with a system of arsenic targeting, the chief advantage of a
cap-and-trade system is that it imposes less of an informational demand on the
government, allowing the market rather than the EPA to ascertain the costs of
arsenic reduction. Under arsenic targeting, the EPA would have to decide, in
every area of the country, the real costs of reduction to various points-a
difficult determination for which error is inevitable. Under cap and trade, those
with low costs will trade their licenses, whereas those with high costs will
attempt to acquire more in the way of arsenic rights. Of course the same
objections that might be made to arsenic targeting might be made to a system of
cap-and-trade. Perhaps poor people will be subject to unusually high arsenic
236. For an excellent discussion, see A. DENNY ELLERMAN ET AL., supra note 50.
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levels. But if these objections are not convincing there, they are also unconvinc-
ing in this context.
Under the SDWA, however, the EPA lacks the authority to implement a
trading system for arsenic. This is a serious gap. The statute should be amended
to allow the EPA to permit trading if the evidence justifies that step. I emphasize
that trading should not be allowed to create what are, under existing science,
unacceptable hot spots.
D. ARSENIC REDUCTION SUBSIDIES
It might be suggested that the EPA should impose a stringent regulation of
arsenic but that the federal government should subsidize communities for which
the annual cost is high. Of course the EPA cannot offer subsidies on its own. But
perhaps Congress should do so. In fact, Congress has made federal financial
assistance available for water systems, and while the relevant programs contain
a degree of discretion, it is certainly possible for financially strapped water
systems to receive federal help.237
Recall that the total cost of the 10 ppb regulation would be about $210
million each year. To say the least, this would not be a large sum in the federal
budget. If the federal government restricted itself to paying the cost of compli-
ance in areas in which the annual per-household cost exceeds $100, its total
taxpayer bill would be about $10 million-hardly a large sum to pay.
This would not be a foolish approach to the arsenic problem. In fact, it seems
quite reasonable. The major difficulty is that the numbers do not tell us whether
this is the best way to spend limited taxpayer dollars. Suppose that the risks that
the regulation is reducing are quite small, so that the regulation will save
somewhere between 0 and 0.5 lives. Is it really worth spending $10 million to
save between 0 and 0.5 lives? Many government programs are designed to
decrease risks to life and health; some of those programs attempt to reduce
violent crime. Perhaps the $10 million would be better spent on those programs.
It would be possible to say that, as a practical matter, any $10 million subsidy is
more likely to come from some other, less valuable use and that by using it to
protect people against the health hazards of arsenic, we would not really be
diverting resources from a more valuable use. Among the universe of imagin-
able government expenditures, a $10 million subsidy is hardly the worst. But in
light of existing data, we cannot be sure that it is the best. The same consider-
ations that justify cost-benefit balancing in the first place suggest that the hard
issues cannot be avoided by arguing for an across-the-board 10 ppb standard
accompanied by a federal subsidy for those who face a difficult financial
burden.
237. National Primary Drinking Water Regulations, 66 Fed. Reg. 6976, 6992 (Jan. 22, 2001)
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 141, 142).
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E. ARSENIC DISCLOSURE
An alternative possibility would be to rely less on regulation and more on
information. In many domains of regulatory policy, government has moved to
replace command-and-control regulation with efforts to require companies to
disclose their activities and the accompanying risks to the public.23 8 In the
context at hand, the suggestion would be simple: Require companies to meet
some statutory requirement-perhaps 30 ppb-so that people are not exposed to
clear harm, but beyond that point, require companies to disclose the level of
arsenic in their drinking water, perhaps with information that would put the
numbers into some context. Perhaps the disclosure requirement would not apply
if companies reached some low level (5 ppb?). We could thus imagine a kind of
three-tiered rule with flat mandates, a disclosure requirement for a certain range,
and a "floor" below which companies would have no disclosure duties.
For arsenic, this strategy would have both advantages and disadvantages.
Because people are not likely to be happy to learn that their drinking water has
relatively high levels of arsenic, one advantage of disclosure is that it could spur
companies to reduce arsenic levels on their own, without governmental require-
ments.2 39 For companies who chose that route, it is likely that the reductions
would not be terribly expensive. Public pressure may produce low-cost reduc-
tions in some areas while also allowing companies to maintain certain levels of
arsenic if the public in those areas was not so concerned in light of the mix of
health benefits and water costs. In this way, disclosure may even produce a kind
of "drinking water federalism." Another advantage of disclosure is that it may
perform an important educative role by ensuring that people will learn that
some carcinogenic substances are not especially dangerous at low levels and
also alerting people to the need for tradeoffs (in the form of a higher water bill).
But of course there are pitfalls as well. We have seen that the very idea of
arsenic in drinking water seems to cause serious public alarm, in part because of
the operation of intuitive toxicology. For a certain percentage of the population,
disclosure of arsenic would itself signal reason for concern and perhaps produce
excessive fear, even panic. Many people may ask why, exactly, companies are
disclosing this fact and whether disclosure means that they are, in some sense,
being poisoned. The point suggests that sometimes disclosure will not really
inform people because their background beliefs will lead them to read the
information badly. The question remains whether it is possible to give some
contextual information so that people have an accurate sense of what the
disclosure actually means. In this context, we should probably be unsure
whether the contextual information would really help.
238. See generally Bradley Karkainen, Information as Environmental Regulation: TRI and Perfor-
mance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L.J. 257 (2001); Cass R. Sunstein,
Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. Rav. 613 (1999).
239. See Karkainen, supra note 238, at 295.
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As a legal matter, the issue is simple because the EPA has no authority to use
information disclosure as a substitute for regulation. In the particular context of the
SDWA, Congress's choice for regulatory mandates may even make sense. But in the
future, it would be useful to allow agencies to experiment in this vein to see if
disclosure will, in some cases, do more good than alternative approaches.
F. THE MISSING QUESTION: DISTRIBUTIONAL ISSUES
There is one significant gap in the discussion thus far: A full account of the
distributional effects of different arsenic regulations. To have an adequate sense of
whether and how to proceed, it would be most valuable to match the assessment of
the range of costs of the rule with an account of the income and wealth of those who
will be subject to those costs. If, for example, those who would bear $300 or more in
increased annual costs are also disproportionately poor, there is good reason for
government to hesitate before imposing the regulation. It is easy to imagine a situation
in which water quality regulation is "regressive" in the sense that its costs come down
especially hard on poor people. That is not a decisive objection to the regulation, but it
is certainly an important point to consider.
It would be easy to imagine the following sort of rejoinder: Shouldn't poor
people have water that is as safe as that of wealthy people? Why should poor
people, including poor children, have water quality inferior to that enjoyed by
wealthy people? The simplest answer is that safety is a matter of degree, and if
safer water quality is very expensive, then poor people are better off without it
than with it. Cars should certainly be safe, but wealthy people are more likely
than poor people to buy Volvos. It would not be a good idea for the government
to force poor people to buy Volvos, and the reason is that if you are poor, you
might reasonably use what money you have on something other than adding an
additional margin of safety to your car. Perhaps you will use that money on
food, or medical care, or shelter. The same is true for water quality. If the
consequence of decreasing (small) risks is to decrease significantly family
income for poor people, then it is perfectly legitimate for the government to
refuse to act. Of course it is possible that the benefits of environmental
regulation will be enjoyed disproportionately by poor people and that they will
bear disproportionately few of the costs.
The more general suggestion is that whenever an agency is producing a
regulatory impact analysis, it should consider a distributional analysis as well. It
is important to know who will bear both the benefits and the burdens of
regulation. A recent study shows, for example, that the benefits of pollution
control in California have gone disproportionately to poor people and minority
group members. 240 It would be extremely desirable to assemble similar informa-
tion for drinking water regulation.
240. See Kahn, supra note 22, at 23-25.
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CONCLUSION
My aim in this Article has been to cast light on the actual practice of CBA by
considering the EPA's most highly publicized decision under the federal statute
that most explicitly calls for that form of analysis. The basic message is that
even when there is a considerable amount of scientific data, it is possible that
CBA will identify only a range of reasonable choices, and often a wide range at
that. With plausible assumptions, the nonmonetized health benefits of new
controls on arsenic in drinking water can be made to seem very small or very
large. Once the health benefits are monetized, the range becomes larger still,
making it extremely difficult to compare costs against benefits.
It would be possible to take this demonstration as an attack on CBA on the
ground that a specification of benefits and costs tells us little that we did not
already know. 24' If CBA is justified as a way of actually producing decisions in
hard cases, CBA has indeed been criticized by the analysis here. But this would
be the wrong lesson. As a substitute for intuitive toxicology and for the
crudeness of the affect heuristic, an effort to trace both costs and benefits can
inform inquiry making decisions less of a stab in the dark. This is indeed a
substantial gain. Once the range is specified, a judgment of value, and not of
fact, will be involved in the ultimate decision whether or not to proceed. But the
judgment of value will be easier to identify once we understand what we
understand and what we do not know. A real virtue of CBA is that it helps to
explain exactly why the choice of regulation in the case of arsenic is genuinely
difficult. In this way CBA is a large improvement over the "intuitive toxicol-
ogy" seen in the public reaction to the decision of the Bush Administration.
I have also attempted to provide a kind of lawyer's primer on the law of
CBA, showing how future cases might be litigated. There is no question that
courts will eventually be asked to assess the kinds of questions raised in this
Article.2 42 Lawyers can drive predicted benefits up or down by manipulating the
dose-response curve, by raising epidemiological questions, by challenging the
discount rate, by asking about the voluntariness and controllability of the risk,
and by quantifying difficult-to-quantify risks. We could easily imagine a dozen
kinds of opinions invalidating a 10 ppb standard as too stringent; we could
easily imagine the same number of opinions invalidating that standard as too
lenient. Indeed, we could easily imagine an emerging set of doctrines in which
courts produce a kind of common law of CBA. In view of the complexity of the
underlying questions, many diverse views would undoubtedly be expressed by
federal courts. I have urged that things would be simplified, and generally
better, if courts maintained a posture of deference, rejecting agency views only
241. This is one reading of Heinzerling, supra note 16.
242. See, e.g., Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991) (asking the court to
evaluate a number of issues explored here, including the appropriate discount rate and both arbitrary
and nonarbitrary ways to balance costs and benefits).
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in cases in which those views are patently unreasonable. There is indeed an
emerging common law of cost-benefit analysis, 2 43 but thus far it is being
generated by agencies rather than courts. This is entirely proper.
I have also discussed the underlying policy issues. The EPA could make
many reasonable decisions here, and in the range below 50 ppb and above 5
ppb, there is no obviously correct choice. But my principal claims have in-
volved broadening the agencies' view screen. First, agencies should have the
flexibility to produce variable standards targeting regulation to areas where it
would survive cost-benefit balancing and also adopting economic incentives to
ensure low-cost solutions. Second, agencies should be required to identify the
winners and losers produced by regulation-to show when poor people or
wealthy people are disproportionate losers or gainers. A distributional analysis
should not be taken as conclusive, but it will help to inform the analysis. An
effort to increase agency flexibility and also to identify both winners and losers
would be natural steps not toward placing regulatory judgments in an arithmetic
straightjacket, but toward ensuring that when government acts, it does so in a
way that is informed by a full account of the consequences.
APPENDIX
Dose-Response Curves
To evaluate risks associated with toxic substances and to undertake cost-
benefit analysis, it is often important to have a sense of the dose-response curve.
For arsenic, clear evidence is absent. This appendix offers a sense of the
possibilities.
The dose-response curve can have a variety of shapes, including linear, where
response increases proportionally with dose. Figure (A)(1) displays the linear
relationship between dietary dose of organophosphate insecticide dioxathion
and inhibition of the enzyme cholinesterase in rats.
Figure (A)(2) demonstrates another linear relationship, this one between
subcutaneous administration of carcinogenic hydrocarbon dibenzanthracene and
tumor incidence in mice.
Chemicals such as benzene, radon, and formaldehyde exhibit sublinear dose-
response relationships, where elicited responses are less than proportional.
Figure (B)(1) displays a sublinear relationship for primary pulmonary (lung)
tumors in rats following exposure to plutonium dioxide.
Figure (B)(2) exhibits a sublinear dose-response relationship between the
number of female rat liver foci (a precursor to cancer) and the log dose of
phenobarbital expressed as picomole per kilogram.
Some chemicals produce no adverse effects below a certain level, resulting in
a threshold curve. Threshold-model agents include dioxins and chrysotile asbes-
243. See COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS, supra note 6, at 310-11.
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tos; in addition, nongenotoxic carcinogens are generally assumed to have
threshold doses. Figure (C)(1) demonstrates a threshold for the carcinogenic
hydrocarbon benzpyrene causing sarcomas in mice.
Dose-response relationships exceeding proportionality, such as vinyl chlo-
ride, are supralinear. Figure (D)(1) demonstrates a supralinear curve for the
inhibition of carboxylesterase enzyme activities in rats as a function of insecti-
cide dioxathion dose.
The slight concave-upward pattern in Figure (D)(2) demonstrates a weaker
supralinear relationship between exposure to radiation via an atomic bomb and
cancer deaths per 10,000 people.
Hermatic chemicals such as essential nutrients and vitamins exhibit beneficial
effects at low doses, coupled with toxic effects at high doses, resulting in a
u-shaped curve. The dose-response relationship of fluoride, which exerts posi-
tive effects at lower doses but is toxic at high doses, is outlined in Figure (E)(1).
HeinOnline  -- 90 Geo. L.J. 2304 2001-2002
THE ARITHMETIC OF ARSENIC
(A) LINEAR RELATIONSHIPS
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(B) SUBLINEAR RELATIONSHIPS
[Vol. 90:2255
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Multistage Carcinogenesis:
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(C) THRESHOLD RELATIONSHIPS
(1) Benzpyrene
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CASARETT AND DOULL'S TOXICOLOGY: THE BASIC SCIENCE OF POISONS 23, fig.2-6 (Mary 0.
Amdur et. al. eds., Pergamon Press 5th ed. 1996), modified from W.R. Bryan & M.B.
Shimkin, Quantitative Analysis of Dose-Response Data Obtained with Three Carcino-
genic Hydrocarbons in Strain C3H Male Mice, 3 J. NAT'L CANCER INST. 503 (1943).
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(D) SUPRALINEAR RELATIONSHIPS
S.D. Murphy & K.L. Cheever, Effects of Feeding Insecticides: Inhibition of Carboxyles-
terase and Cholinesterase Activities in Rats, 17 ARCHIVES ENVTL. HEALTH, 749 (1968),
reprinted in CASARETT AND DOULL's TOXICOLOGY: THE BASIC SCIENCE OF POISONS 19,
fig.2-2 (Mary 0. Amdur et. al. eds., Pergamon Press 5th ed. 1996).
(2) Atomic Bomb Radiation
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RIC/chp 14F.html#fig 14e.
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(E) U-SHAPED RELATIONSH4IPS
(1) Fluoride
30
0
" 20
0
10
-10
Dose
Gordon A. Fox, EVR 2001: Risk and Toxicity 9-10, fig.2 (2000), at http://chuma.cas.usf.
edu!-gfox/EVR2001/risk and-toxicity.pdf (last visited Sept. 4, 2002).
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